Primary Barriers to Regulating Potentially Carcinogenic Pesticides in the United States: A Case Study of Glyphosate by Wardle, Tessa
Occidental College
OxyScholar
UEP Student Scholarship Urban and Environmental Policy
Spring 2017
Primary Barriers to Regulating Potentially
Carcinogenic Pesticides in the United States: A
Case Study of Glyphosate
Tessa Wardle
Occidental College
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.oxy.edu/uep_student
Part of the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons
This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Urban and Environmental Policy at OxyScholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in UEP
Student Scholarship by an authorized administrator of OxyScholar. For more information, please contact cdla@oxy.edu.
Recommended Citation
Wardle, Tessa, "Primary Barriers to Regulating Potentially Carcinogenic Pesticides in the United States: A Case Study of Glyphosate"
(2017). UEP Student Scholarship.
http://scholar.oxy.edu/uep_student/1
	  	  
 
PRIMARY BARRIERS TO REGULATING POTENTIALLY 
CARCINOGENIC PESTICIDES IN THE UNITED STATES:  
A CASE STUDY OF GLYPHOSATE 
 
 
Tessa Wardle 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Occidental College 
Urban and Environmental Policy Comprehensive Project 
Mijin Cha 
 
 
May 12th 2017 
 	  	  
	   2	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	   3	  
Executive	  Summary	  	  
Due to the widespread negative health impacts associated with chemical pesticides, the 
purpose of this study is to explore issues within the EPA’s pesticide regulation process and 
examine whether avenues exist to make pesticide regulation more protective of public health.  In 
examining pesticide regulation in the United States, this paper focuses on glyphosate, as the 
chemical has demonstrated potential to be a carcinogen through multiple sources of evidence, but 
is not acknowledged as such by the EPA. The research questions asked are: What are the primary 
barriers to banning potentially carcinogenic pesticides in the United States, and can the process 
used by independent agencies in determining glyphosate a probable carcinogen inform the EPA’s 
methods for coming to more sensitive hazard assessment conclusions? The key barriers to 
stronger restrictions on potentially carcinogenic pesticides are identified by interviews with 
experts in pesticide regulation in the United States who are knowledgeable about glyphosate. The 
primary barriers identified include the wide reach of industry influence, in both the formal and 
informal spheres, systematic issues within the Office of Pesticide Programs, such as program 
cuts and growing numbers of pesticides to review, considering the benefits of a pesticide during 
regulatory processes, only examining active ingredients instead of formulations, and giving too 
much weight to animal studies and not enough to epidemiology studies. Additional barriers 
specific to glyphosate include minimal low cost alternatives, widespread dependence of farmers 
on the herbicide, and errors made in the hazard assessment leading the EPA to not recognize its 
carcinogenic potential, paving the way for less stringent regulation.  
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Introduction	  
Chemical pesticides have become ubiquitous in our surroundings; as residue on food, on 
the lawns children play in, in sidewalk cracks, and filling the air those that work in traditional 
agriculture breathe. Pesticides have even been detected in rainfall in agricultural watersheds 
across the United States (Pretty and Hine 2005) (J. Vogel, Majewski, and Capel 2008). Pesticide 
exposure has been associated with cancer, birth defects or miscarriages, damage to key 
developmental and neurological processes, inhibitions of important enzymes, and further adverse 
health effects (Cropper et al. 1992). Rising incidence of some cancers can in part be attributed to 
widespread exposure to chemical pesticides, especially when exposure occurs during 
developmental years (Wogan et al. 2004) (Wilson and Schwarzman 2009). Chemical pesticides 
are not only harmful to humans, but also to the ecosystems they inevitably seep into. High levels 
of pesticide use in the United States further lead to incidences of pesticide poisonings, declining 
numbers of pollinators, and polluting waterways. Due to the widespread impacts of chemical 
pesticides, the purpose of this study is to explore issues within the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s pesticide regulation process and examine whether avenues exist to make pesticide 
regulation more protective of public health. 1 The research questions asked are: What are the 
primary barriers to strong regulation of potentially carcinogenic pesticides in the United States 
and can the process used by independent agencies that determined glyphosate to be a probable 
carcinogen inform the EPA’s methods for coming to more sensitive hazard assessment 
conclusions?2  
To address the research question, this paper focuses on the potentially carcinogenic 
pesticide glyphosate, the most widely used herbicide in the world, that can be found as residue 
on an increasing variety of food items, both fresh and processed (Gillam 2016e) (Myers et al. 
2016) (Samsel and Seneff 2013).	  3 In 2015, the International Agency for Research on Cancer 
(IARC) determined glyphosate to be a probable carcinogen. Meanwhile, in 2016 the United 
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) released a draft Hazard Assessment declaring 
glyphosate “unlikely to be carcinogenic to humans.” Examining this discrepancy helps analyze 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  I define “regulation” broadly to mean policies and actions controlling pesticide use.  2 Carcinogen refers to a substance or exposure that can cause cancer. 3 Herbicides are a class of pesticides that are used to kill weeds, distinct from insecticides that target 
insects, and fungicides used to kill fungi. All can be described as pesticides. 
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the barriers faced by the EPA in coming to conclusions that support stronger regulation. Because 
the EPA has only produced the Draft Hazard Assessment of glyphosate, this paper primarily 
focuses on the barriers to stronger regulation of potentially carcinogenic pesticides that occur in 
the hazard identification phase.  
Strong governmental action on glyphosate alone does not go far enough in reducing 
negative impacts associated with chemical pesticides in the environment, however determining 
the barriers to strongly regulating glyphosate is important as they overlap significantly with 
barriers to stricter limitations on all chemical pesticides. Identifying the factors standing in the 
way of pesticide regulation leads to an understanding of what needs to change systematically in 
order to achieve a toxic chemical pesticide-free environment in the future.  
Background	  
Glyphosate	  Use	  and	  Health	  Effects	  	  
Widespread	  Use	  of	  Glyphosate	  
 The herbicidal potential of glyphosate was discovered by a Monsanto chemist, and in 
1974, Monsanto first marketed the widely popular Roundup product (Benbrook 2016). Now, 
glyphosate is manufactured by 91 producers, more than 750 products contain glyphosate, and it 
is the most widely used herbicide in the world (IARC 2015). Despite being associated with a 
wide range of products and producers, glyphosate is still most widely recognized as the main 
ingredient in the original product, Monsanto’s Roundup. Overall, glyphosate is used on more 
than 150 food and non-food crops (Sass and Hwang 2016). In addition to its use on crops, 
glyphosate is used for weed control in private yards and public spaces.  
Glyphosate is a generalist herbicide, and when applied it will kill most plants on contact 
through inhibiting a growth enzyme (“IARC Monographs Volume 112: Evaluation of 
Glyphosate” 2016). This characteristic previously meant glyphosate could only be carefully 
applied to control weeds in the borders between crops, without making contact with the crop 
itself. Now, with GMO developments certain crops have been modified to withstand glyphosate, 
most commonly marketed by Monsanto as “Roundup Ready” seeds. In fact, 45% of glyphosate 
demand is accounted for by production of genetically modified crops, particularly soybeans, 
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corn, and cotton (IARC 2015). Figure 1 displays the nearly exponential increases in glyphosate 
use on corn and soybeans since the 1996 development of GMO crops resistant to glyphosate.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Figure	  1:	  Glyphosate	  Use	  by	  Year	  and	  Crop,	  2014	  
	  
Source:	  USGS	  Pesticide	  National	  Synthesis	  Project,	  Pesticide	  Use	  Maps	  (USGS 2014)	  
	  
Glyphosate use has increased 100-fold since the mid 1970s when it was first introduced 
by Monsanto (Myers et al. 2016). Now, it is estimated that over 250 million pounds of 
glyphosate are sprayed annually in the United States alone (USGS 2011). From 1987 to 2007, 
glyphosate use increased faster and more substantially than that of any other pesticide (Myers et 
al. 2016). This trend is expected to continue, despite many weeds developing resistance to 
glyphosate. Potential future increased use of the chemical can be attributed to reformulations 
combining glyphosate with other herbicides, glyphosate used to replace herbicides identified as 
more highly toxic, as well as novel uses of the weedkiller, specifically to dry wheat before 
harvest.  
Glyphosate	  in	  the	  Environment	  
 As one would expect, high levels of glyphosate use lead to high levels of glyphosate in 
the environment. However, it is currently unclear exactly how pervasive glyphosate is in our 
surroundings, nor exactly how it persists in air and water. Lack of clarity over the amount of 
glyphosate in the environment, in addition to a minimal monitoring of glyphosate and its 
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metabolites in the general population, poses a challenge as it means there is not a clear, 
comprehensive understanding of human exposure to glyphosate (Myers et al. 2016). The FDA 
recently began testing common products for glyphosate content, but these efforts have proved 
challenging, and are on pause as of November 2016. Before testing was paused, the FDA found 
glyphosate in honey advertised as “pure” and “natural”, instant oatmeal, and baby food (Gillam 
2016b).  
Routes	  of	  Exposure	  	  
Determining the extent the general population is exposed to glyphosate is important due 
to the potential health impacts this chemical could have. Pesticide residue on food is often a 
primary concern, and is an important route to consider as more reports of glyphosate in 
unexpected foods have been released (Gillam 2016a). Another important source of exposure is 
Roundup sold in the home and garden market, which can lead consumers to have direct contact 
with higher volumes of the herbicide. Glyphosate consistently ranks as the second most 
commonly used home and garden pesticide in the United States (IARC 2015). Farmworkers and 
chemical manufacturers experience the highest rates of exposure, and can be subjected to high 
levels of glyphosate on a daily bases, usually additionally combined with other chemicals.  
 
Figure 2: Map of glyphosate use in pounds per square mile for agricultural purposes in the 
United States. Source: USGS Water Survey 2011  
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Human	  Health	  Effects	  of	  Glyphosate	  
Through multiple sources of evidence, glyphosate has demonstrated potential to be a 
carcinogen. Occupational exposure studies of glyphosate demonstrate a correlation between 
glyphosate and non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma, while in-vitro studies (“within the glass”– meaning 
studies not performed on live animals, but on cells or biological molecules) identify glyphosate’s 
potential to have endocrine disrupting effects in human cell lines (Gasnier et al. 2009).4 
Endocrine disrupting properties are cause for concern because endocrine disruptors tend to be 
most damaging with long-term exposure, and especially harmful if exposure occurs during 
development, even if dosage is low (Myers et al. 2016). Other in-vitro studies have found 
evidence hinting glyphosate could be a neurotoxin. Scientists even made a connection between 
glyphosate exposure and gluten intolerance due to glyphosate inhibiting enzyme producing gut 
bacteria (Samsel and Seneff 2014). According to the IARC monograph, the most direct evidence 
that glyphosate is a carcinogen comes from animal studies. Numerous studies on lab rats or mice 
have demonstrated either liver injury, damage to connective tissue, or “tumor promoting 
activity” influencing the development of renal tubule carcinoma, a type of kidney cancer, 
hemangiosarcoma, a type of canine cancer, and pancreatic islet-cell adenoma, a type of cancer 
that occurs in the pancreas (George et al. 2009) (Chang and Delzell 2016). While studies also 
exist that find glyphosate’s potential health effects to be minimal, there is a clear need to further 
test the carcinogenic potential of glyphosate, especially given the widespread nature of its use, 
and the potential for it to be toxic at low levels (J. M. Vogel 2004).   
IARC’s	  Listing	  of	  Glyphosate	  as	  a	  Probable	  Carcinogen	  
In March of 2015, the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), a subset of 
the World Health Organization (WHO), declared glyphosate to be a probable carcinogen. This 
determination caused a substantial ripple effect, from coverage by the mainstream media such as 
the New York Times questioning the safety of glyphosate, to individual cities and towns banning  
or restricting the herbicide, to Monsanto pushing to remove American Cancer Society funding 
from IARC and attempting to discredit the scientists that worked on the monograph (Pollack 
2015) (Gillam 2016c). The highly respected International Agency for Research on Cancer came 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4 Endocrine disruptors interfere with the body’s hormone system and can cause a range of adverse effects. 
They pose the greatest risk when exposure occurs early on in life (NIH). 
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to conclusions quite different from those of the EPA, which has glyphosate listed as a Group E 
chemical, the classification for evidence of non-carcinogenicity in humans (Kasprak 2016). To 
investigate this discrepancy, this paper focuses on the barriers within and outside of the EPA that 
lead the agency to less sensitive conclusions on the carcinogenic potential of pesticides than a 
leading independent agency on cancer research. 
Background	  on	  the	  EPA’s	  Regulation	  of	  Pesticides	  
Different	  Agencies	  Involved	  in	  Pesticide	  Regulation	  
The EPA is the main government body responsible for regulating pesticides and does so 
through setting acceptable residue levels and enforceable tolerances, reviewing safety 
information, registering pesticides, and monitoring compliance (NPIC 2012). Within the EPA is 
a special department in charge of pesticide regulation, called the Office of Pesticide Programs 
(OPP). The OPP implements the main acts and laws relating to pesticides through reviewing 
studies on the effects of a pesticide that is either being proposed for registration or undergoing a 
periodic registration review. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) play a role in monitoring pesticide residue on food through 
testing food produced domestically and food that is imported. Additionally, the United States 
Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) works with the EPA in overseeing the impacts pesticides 
have on threatened and endangered species, and enforcing regulations controlling such impacts 
(NPIC 2012). States have the ability to impose stricter regulations than those enforced nationally 
through State Department of Agriculture offices (NPIC 2016). Pesticide use can also be 
restricted at the city or town level.  
Acts	  and	  Laws	  Governing	  Pesticide	  Regulation	  	  
Before the creation of the EPA in 1970, the USDA and the FDA were the primary 
governing agencies responsible for regulating chemical pesticides (F. R. Davis 2014). In 1938, 
Congress passed the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), marking an important 
early legislation for pesticides (F. R. Davis 2014). This act introduced setting safe levels of 
“unavoidable” poisonous substances, like pesticides, on food. 
The principle act governing pesticide regulation is the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act (FIRFA). Passed in 1947, FIRFA requires pesticides to be registered before they 
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are sold on the market, as well as product labels specifying both content and whether the 
substance is poisonous. Because of FIRFA, registration is required for all pesticides on the 
market, and approval for use is granted by the governing agency, pending testing of the proposed 
active ingredient. While the initial version of the act tended toward leniency for industry, overall, 
it served as a step towards further development of stronger regulation (F. R. Davis 2014).  
FIRFA has been amended numerous times since 1947; notably in 1964 when an 
amendment increased the authority of the governing agency (not yet the EPA) to remove 
products from the market based on safety concerns through removing or suspending registration 
of a pesticide (F. R. Davis 2014). This amendment also changed FIRFA by requiring special 
consideration of pesticides thought to cause unreasonable adverse effects. The act defines this as, 
“(1) any unreasonable risk to man or the environment, taking into account the economic, social, 
and environmental costs and benefits of the use of any pesticide, or (2) a human dietary risk from 
residues that result from a use of a pesticide in or on any food inconsistent with the standard” 
(Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 2012). After this update, any pesticide sold 
or used in the United States must first be approved by the regulating agency based on the 
determination that it does not cause any unreasonable adverse effects. 
The Federal Environmental Pest Control Act (FEPCA) passed in 1972, and amended 
FIRFA by significantly increasing authority of the newly created EPA in regulating pesticides. It 
is important to note that this happened after the publication of Silent Spring, the influential book 
by Rachel Carson featuring DDT that widened public awareness and outcry over the 
environmental disasters pesticides could cause (Griswold 2012). The discourse among regulators 
was leaning towards the need for stronger regulation, however Silent Spring is often credited 
with substantially increasing awareness and wariness among the American public, especially 
among environmentalists (F. R. Davis 2014). Important aspects of the 1972 amendments include 
the reexamination of the safety of pesticides registered in the prior four years, along with the 
addition of a restricted use classification, which means certain pesticides could only be used by a 
permitted user.  
The Food Quality Protection Act (FQPA), passed in 1996, updates FIRFA as an 
important asset to stronger regulations of pesticides applied to food products because it mandates 
that the EPA impose a “safety factor” reduction of chronic reference dose level by three to ten 
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percent if there is any uncertainty about the safety of a chemical (Public Law 104-170 1996).5 
This uncertainty can arise from gaps in data, conflicting studies, or questions over the quality of 
toxicology data (Myers et al. 2016). The safety factor is intended to protect infants and children, 
as they are more affected by chemical exposure than adults and are considered a sensitive 
population (Wilson and Schwarzman 2009). FQPA additionally requires the EPA to reassess 
pesticide tolerances every 10 years, giving “priority to those that pose the greatest risk to public 
health” (Public Law 104-170 1996). For a further history of important acts relating to pesticides, 
see Appendix item 1.  
Process	  Behind	  Regulation	  
The EPA carries a large responsibility in reviewing the scientific information guiding 
important decisions in its duty as the main governing agency responsible for upholding the 
numerous acts regulating pesticides. The 1972 amendment to FIRFA had major implications for 
how pesticides were approved, and required the EPA to reregister the approximately 40,000 
pesticides that were on the market at the time (Cropper et al. 1992). Now, when a new pesticide 
is developed, the approval process involves a four-step procedure that includes input from 
industry, EPA reviewers, input from an independent scientific panel, and outside interests. First, 
the company producing an active ingredient for use as a pesticide is required to submit a 
proposal to the EPA for registration approval. This proposal must include data on potential risks 
to human health and the environment, the potential for the pesticide to end up as residues on 
food, the identity and quantity of all products, labeling, directions for use, and safety information 
(OECA US EPA 2006). Next, the EPA is directed by FIRFA to complete a special review of any 
pesticides thought to have particular danger to public health or the environment, as identified by 
the chemical company in the initial registration proposal. As glyphosate was never identified as 
posing a danger to public health and the environment, it has never undergone a full review. The 
goal of the special review is to determine whether the risks associated with the use of the active 
ingredient outweigh the benefits in a risk benefit assessment. Two separate risk assessments 
address the impact of the pesticide on human health and the environment. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5 Chronic reference dose refers to an estimate of daily exposure to a chemical through ingestion that 
likely would not cause any risk or deleterious effects during a lifetime (EPA 2011).  
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Figure	  3:	  The	  4	  Step	  Risk	  Assessment	  Process	  
 
Source: (EPA, 2017) 
 
A risk assessment includes four steps, as illustrated in Figure 3, starting with hazard 
identification, during which the EPA determines if the chemical has potential to be a hazard to 
human health or the environment at any dose. In this part of the process, the EPA also reviews 
open literature, not just data provided by the registrant. While this paper primarily focuses on the 
barriers to stronger regulation that occur during the hazard assessment phase, it is still important 
to get a full idea of what comes next, as the forces that affect the hazard identification phase can 
apply to following steps that inform regulation.  
After the hazard identification assessment, a dose-response assessment considers the 
effects of the pesticide at different doses. Along with the dose-response assessment is an 
exposure assessment, during which the EPA determines the current levels at which the 
population is exposed to the pesticide. Finally, the risk assessment concludes by characterizing 
the risk of the pesticide to the exposed population based on how actual exposure levels compare 
to dose-response results (OA US EPA 2015). The EPA’s proposal based on the full risk 
assessment is either “(1) cancellation of registration; (2) suspension of registration; (3) 
continuation of registration, subject to certain restrictions; or (4) unrestricted continuation of 
registration” (Cropper et al. 1992). This proposal is then open to public comment, where the 
public can submit comments to the EPA that the agency will consider when coming to a final 
decision. The EPA’s final decision on the regulation of the pesticide could be either an outright 
ban, or the restriction of certain uses or users.  
When regulating pesticides, the EPA solely examines the active ingredient proposed by 
the registrant, instead of testing the formulated mixture that will make up the marketed product. 
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The EPA assesses inactive ingredients for safety, however they are not assessed in combination 
with the active ingredient they are mixed with. This can be problematic because inactive 
ingredients have been demonstrated to play a role in increasing the toxicity of the active 
ingredient (Mesnage et al. 2014). This mismatch has specifically been identified with tests of 
Roundup formulation against pure glyphosate (Mesnage et al. 2014).  
History	  of	  the	  EPA’s	  Regulation	  of	  Glyphosate	  	  	  
The EPA initially classified glyphosate as a possible carcinogen in 1985, primarily based 
on a study finding kidney tumors in male rats exposed to glyphosate (EPA 2016c). After a year, 
the EPA requested that a FIRFA Scientific Advisory Board re-assess the carcinogenicity of 
glyphosate in response to pressure from Monsanto, who felt glyphosate should be moved to a 
lower classification. The Scientific Advisory Board determined glyphosate was safe through 
arguing the data from the study showing tumors in rats could be interpreted as inconclusive. The 
board recommended moving glyphosate from Group C chemical classification to Group D, “not 
classifiable as a human carcinogen,” and addressed the need to clear up the ambiguity by 
recommending the examination and creation of additional rodent studies.  
Currently, glyphosate is regulated through labels directing use to ensure minimal 
exposure, and maximum allowable tolerance levels as residue on and in food. Federal code 
outlines allowable tolerances for 141 crops, from asparagus and different types of animal feed to 
sweet potato and wasabi root (§180.364 Glyphosate; Tolerances for Residues 1980). 
Additionally, the EPA imposes a detection limit to the amount of glyphosate in drinking water of 
0.006 mg/l, which is among the higher concentrations of the list of chemicals covered by this 
regulation, likely because glyphosate has long been considered less toxic than other pesticides 
(§141.24 Organic Chemicals, Sampling and Analytical Requirements, n.d.). In general, 
glyphosate is regulated in terms of how much is allowed in the environment as a toxin, but is not 
restricted to certain uses or users (EPA 2016b).  
In 2009, the EPA began a registration review of glyphosate to “ensure it still performs its 
intended function without unreasonable adverse effects on human health and the environment” 
(Environmental Protection Agency 2009). This review was due to be completed in 2015, but due 
to delays has been pushed back multiple times, and now is expected to be complete by spring of 
2017. This review included all relevant glyphosate data available to the EPA, including both 
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Monsanto studies and studies published in open literature. The Cancer Assessment Review 
Committee (CARC) of the EPA released their report to the Glyphosate Registration Review 
Docket in September of 2016, concluding that glyphosate was “not likely to be carcinogenic to 
humans” (EPA 2016a) The draft of the full review went through the period of public comment in 
December of 2016 and January 2017. In early March of 2017, the Scientific Advisory Panel 
reviewing both the draft hazard assessment and all public comments released the results of their 
deliberations. Ultimately, the panel was divided over whether or not they agree with the EPA’s 
classification that glyphosate is “not likely carcinogenic.” Some panel members believe a more 
accurate classification would be “suggestive evidence of carcinogenic potential.” Now the EPA 
must incorporate the Panel’s remarks in a final hazard assessment.  
Influence	  of	  the	  Agrochemical	  Industry	  on	  Pesticide	  Regulation	  
While it is important to acknowledge the benefits the agrochemical industry has 
provided, such as economic growth, contributing billions of dollars to the U.S. GDP, 
employment (in 2012, there were approximately 36,800 jobs in the pesticide, fertilizer, and other 
agricultural chemical manufacturing fields), and efficient pest and weed management, it is 
arguably more important to consider these benefits alongside the immense harm caused by the 
widespread use of agrochemicals (Henderson 2016). From a monetary perspective, the 
application of pesticides has been calculated to cost a total of $10 billion per year in externalities, 
including $1.1 billion per year for public health (Pimentel 2005). 
While the EPA does put substantial effort into gathering data on pesticides in order to 
protect public health and the environment, the influence of agrochemical companies in the 
regulatory process creates a conflict of interest that undermines this ultimate goal.6 This conflict 
of interest is embedded in the very process of pesticide regulation, as corporate-backed science is 
the main source of information for the EPA when initially registering a pesticide. Another issue 
with industry providing science used to back regulatory decisions is that this corporate science is 
generally not available to the public, therefore making this part of the process not transparent. 
This lack of transparency means independent scientists cannot fully review the data backing the 
EPA’s initial registration decisions.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  The “agrochemical companies” or “pesticide industry” I refer to in this paper describes the makers of 
pesticides, a group that has been shrinking into a small number of large corporations, such as Monsanto, 
Dow Chemical, DuPont, and Syngenta.	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Using industry-produced science is not the only avenue for agrochemical companies to 
influence pesticide regulation. Agrochemical companies partake in significant lobbying for 
looser pesticide regulation, or expanding the allowed use of chemicals. The agrochemical 
corporation Monsanto has spent over $76,700,000 in lobbying since 1998, and $8,930,000 in 
2015 and 2016 (OpenSecrets). In 2016, 75% of Monsanto’s donations went to Republican House 
Representatives and Senators, notably in states with high agriculture production like Iowa, 
Minnesota, California, Missouri, Illinois, and Idaho (OpenSecrets). Aside from companies 
lobbying directly, lobbying groups such as the American Chemical Council, Croplife America, 
and the American Farm Bureau Federation provide additional support for chemical pesticide 
producer interests in Washington (Pesticide Action Network 2016). Because it is costly for the 
EPA to constantly have chemical companies fighting regulation decisions with lawsuits, the EPA 
often ends up working out negotiations with manufacturers, further increasing their power 
(Pesticide Action Network 2016). Chemical companies have a large incentive to keep up the 
fight due to the high profits pesticides bring in. For example, glyphosate earned Monsanto $4.8 
billion in revenue in 2015 alone. Agrochemical corporations like Monsanto have been steadily 
amassing power over the past 10 years through mergers and buyouts, with only a few 
corporations controlling the entire industry (Yoon 2006).  	   Along with providing money, chemical companies have a history of providing people to 
work within the regulatory system despite a clear conflict of interest (Yoon 2006). During the 
Clinton administration, the CEO of Cargill, Ernest Micek, was appointed as a member of the 
Presidential Advisory Board charged with finding ways to expand exports (Yoon 2006). This 
exchange of personnel can occur in reverse as well, with regulators seeking more lucrative 
employment with the industry they used to regulate. This exchange of personnel across corporate 
and political bounds is accurately nicknamed the “revolving door” (Yoon 2006). Linda Fisher 
provides a perfect example of the revolving door. After working for the EPA for 10 years as the 
Assistant Administrator for Prevention, Pesticides and Toxins, in 1995 she took a position at 
Monsanto as the VP for Government Affairs. In 2001 Fisher was back at the EPA serving as the 
Deputy Administrator. Currently (and for the past 12 years) Fisher works for DuPont Chemicals 
as the VP Safety, Health and Environment and Chief Sustainability Officer (“Linda Fisher” 
Linkedin). Overall, through providing the science to back regulatory decisions, high pressure 
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lobbying, and the crossover of employees, the agrochemical industry is deeply embedded in the 
EPA’s process for regulating pesticides.  
Background	  on	  IARC	  
 In March of 2015, the International Agency for Cancer Research (IARC) added 
glyphosate to its list of probable carcinogens. IARC is a subset of the World Health Organization 
(WHO) dedicated to cancer research. Over the past 50 years, IARC has evaluated over 1,000 
agents that could cause cancer (Portier et al. 2016). These agents are not just chemicals, but 
include foods such as red meat, fabrics, occupations, and objects such as cell phones (IARC 
2016). There are five groups under which IARC classifies carcinogens, listed in Figure 4. These 
include Group 1, defined as carcinogenic to humans, Group 2A, defined as probably 
carcinogenic to humans, Group 2B, defined as possibly carcinogenic to humans, Group 3, the 
largest group with 502 agents defined as not classifiable as carcinogenic to humans, and Group 
4, defined as probably not carcinogenic to humans (IARC 2016).  
 
Figure	  4:	  IARC’s	  Classification	  of	  Agents	  
Group	   Classification	   Parameter	   Number	  of	  agents	  
1	   Carcinogenic	  to	  humans	   Sufficient	  evidence	  of	  carcinogenicity	  in	  
humans	  and	  in	  experimental	  animals	  
118	  
2A	   Probably	  carcinogenic	  to	  
humans	  
Limited	  evidence	  of	  carcinogenicity	  in	  humans	  
and	  sufficient	  evidence	  of	  carcinogenicity	  in	  
experimental	  animals	  
65	  
2B	   Possibly	  carcinogenic	  to	  humans	   Limited	  evidence	  of	  carcinogenicity	  in	  humans	  
and	  less	  than	  sufficient	  evidence	  of	  
carcinogenicity	  in	  experimental	  animals	  
274	  
3	   The	  agent	  is	  not	  classifiable	  as	  to	  
its	  carcinogenicity	  to	  humans	  
Inadequate	  evidence	  of	  carcinogenicity	  in	  
humans	  and	  in	  experimental	  animals	  
504	  
4	   The	  agent	  is	  probably	  not	  
carcinogenic	  to	  humans	  
Evidence	  suggesting	  lack	  of	  carcinogenicity	  in	  
humans	  and	  in	  experimental	  animals	  
1	  
Source: (IARC 2016) 
IARC’s	  Process	  for	  Producing	  Monographs	  
 IARC’s process for producing reports involves gathering a group of ad hoc international 
scientists with substantial expertise and no conflicts of interest regarding the agent they are 
recruited to review (IARC 2015). These scientists examine the agent, or agents, in question for 
12 months, followed by an eight-day meeting in Lyon, France at the headquarters of the agency 
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(Portier et al. 2016). When examining the results and validity of studies relating to the agent, 
IARC scientists have to rule out chance, bias, and confounding factors (Portier et al. 2016). The 
review solely considers studies and documents that are publicly available, which leads to the 
exclusion of industry studies that are not made public due to “Confidential Business 
Information” contained in the studies (Portier et al. 2016). Instead of taking the results of each 
study they review at face value, the team of scientists makes their own conclusions based on the 
evidence presented. For example, if the authors of a toxicology study state there is no evidence 
of carcinogenicity, yet the IARC scientists believe the results do show evidence of 
carcinogenicity, they will use their own conclusions over the authors (Pollack 2015). When 
establishing a link to cancer, IARC uses four levels of evidence: sufficient evidence, limited 
evidence, inadequate evidence, and evidence suggesting lack of carcinogenicity (Cogliano). 
Finding limited evidence can be a misleading label, because it does not mean there is no 
evidence, simply that there is room to find additional evidence, perhaps implying the need for 
additional research. 
 
Figure	  5:	  IARC’s	  Three	  Sources	  of	  Literature 
 
Source: (IARC, 2015) 
IARC’s	  Conclusion	  on	  Glyphosate	  
The IARC team decided glyphosate is a probable carcinogen, and therefore falls within 
Group 2A. This result is based on “a small number of epidemiological studies following 
occupational exposures, rodent studies showing associations between glyphosate and renal 
tubule carcinoma, haemangiosarcoma, pancreatic islet cell adenoma, and/or skin tumors, and 
Animal	  Studies	   SufQicient	  Evidence	   Limited	  Evidence	   Inadequate	  Evidence	   Evidence	  suggesting	  lack	  of	  carcinogenicity	  
Epidemiology	  Studies	   SufQicient	  Evidence	   Limited	  Evidence	   Inadequate	  Evidence	   Evidence	  suggesting	  lack	  of	  carcinogenicity	  
In-­‐vitro	  Studies	   SufQicient	  Evidence	   Limited	  Evidence	   Inadequate	  Evidence	   Evidence	  suggesting	  lack	  of	  carcinogenicity	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strong, diverse mechanistic data” (Myers et al. 2016). Putting together the results of a significant 
number of animal studies, the scientists determined there is sufficient evidence demonstrating the 
carcinogenic potential of glyphosate. They did not find sufficient evidence for glyphosate’s 
carcinogenicity in studies involving humans due to the results of the Agricultural Health Study, 
which did not find a significant enough connection between glyphosate exposure and non-
Hodgkin’s lymphoma to draw conclusions of cause and effect (Portier et al. 2016). The 
Agricultural Health Study is commissioned by the United States government and is a large 
epidemiologic study designed to observe health effects from working in agriculture. However, it 
has been faulted for not following glyphosate exposed farmers for long enough to see signs of 
cancer after exposure. To reiterate, the declaration that glyphosate is a probable carcinogen came 
from limited evidence of carcinogenicity in humans, but sufficient evidence in experimental 
animals and strong evidence for two carcinogenic mechanisms (Guyton et al. 2015).7 
Literature	  Review	  
Literature	  Demonstrating	  the	  Effect	  of	  Industry	  on	  Pesticide	  Regulation	  
There is agreement in the literature that the agrochemical industry is motivated to 
influence regulators to avoid policies that would reduce pesticide use to a specific level, and 
manage to effectively play an influential role in the regulatory process (Marcoux and Urpelainen 
2011) (“Agroecological Approaches to Pest Management in the US” 2005) (van der Wulp and 
Pretty 2005) (Yoon 2006) (Cropper et al. 1992) This is part of the wider literature addressing 
how “regulatory failure is politically driven as narrow special interests advance their goals 
without regard to the societal costs” (Marcoux and Urpelainen 2011). In part as a result of this, 
for many years U.S. agricultural policy has favored the large-scale industrial model that 
generally leads to high levels of pesticide use (“Agroecological Approaches to Pest Management 
in the US” 2005) (Mermarsdeghi and Patel 2003). 
In 2011, Christopher Marcoux and Johannes Urpelainen performed a statistical test on the 
possible influence of the agrochemical industry on regulatory decisions that lead to the overuse 
of pesticides. Marcoux and others used quantitative data on pesticide use and found that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7 Carcinogenic mechanisms are genetic changes that could lead to cancer 
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“agrochemical industry is a crucial determinant of pesticides use in nations with low corruption” 
(Marcoux and Urpelainen 2011). While this study examined agrochemical industries and 
regulatory systems internationally, it is applicable to whether or not industry is able to sway 
regulation in general.  
While some recognize the use of industry science in pesticide regulation as acceptable, in 
the article “Association of financial or professional conflict of interest to research outcomes on 
health risks or nutritional assessment studies of genetically modified products,” Diels and others 
report, “Over time, associations have repeatedly been observed between study outcomes favoring 
the industry’s point of view and industry sponsorship, suggesting a publication bias generated 
through the presence of [conflicts of interest]” (Diels et al. 2010). Study outcomes favoring 
industry’s point of view have the potential to lead to improper assessments of a pesticide’s 
safety.  
Literature	  on	  the	  Failures	  of	  the	  Toxicology	  System	  Informing	  Pesticide	  Regulation	  
As glyphosate has been associated with endocrine disrupting properties and the ability to 
cause damage at low exposure levels, it is important to consider how the regulatory toxicology 
system fails to properly address endocrine disruptors, particularly through the use of the 
traditional dose-response relationship. The dose-response relationship is the idea that as one 
raises the dose; the response of an organism will increase, in a relationship specific to each 
chemical. This relationship does not apply to endocrine disruptors because they can be harmful 
at very low doses. A study by Jason Vogel titled “Tunnel Vision: The Failure of the Regulatory 
System to Address Endocrine Disruptors” delves into this discrepancy. Vogel conducts a detailed 
analysis of the EPA’s Endocrine Disruption Screening Program, ultimately deeming it a failure 
in protecting public health due to the assumptions of the scientific testing (such as the dose-
response relationship), and the regulation paradigm. Vogel’s article provides evidence to the 
failures of regulatory toxicology to properly address endocrine disruptors, calling for a revision 
of the role of science in making decisions about chemical regulation (J. M. Vogel 2004).    
 Another important failure of regulatory toxicology is the lack of consideration of inert 
ingredients when regulating pesticides. Scientists have proven that inert ingredients in pesticide 
formulas that label glyphosate as the primary active ingredient amplify the potential harm of the 
chemical in comparison to glyphosate on its own (Cox and Surgan 2006) (Weinhold 2010) 
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(Mesnage et al. 2014). Robin Mesnage and others performed such a study in 2014, titled “Major 
Pesticides Are More Toxic to Human Cells Than Their Declared Active Ingredients.” Their 
study tested the toxicity of nine different pesticides including glyphosate on key processes in 
human cells. Of the nine pesticides tested, Roundup was among the most toxic. For eight out of 
the nine pesticides, the formulations were “up to one thousand times more toxic than their active 
principles” (Mesnage et al. 2014). This demonstrates a key problem with the toxicology system 
that solely tests active ingredients when determining acceptable doses. Researchers Cox and 
Surgan additionally call for the assessment of formulations over solely testing the active 
ingredient when regulating pesticides in the article “Unidentified Inert Ingredients in Pesticides: 
Implications for Human and Environmental Health.” While they do not conduct a study 
comparing the toxicity of formulations against the toxicity of just the active ingredient, their 
article covers the history and process of testing, as well as the implications of not testing inactive 
ingredients (Cox and Surgan 2006).  
Literature	  on	  Glyphosate	  and	  Human	  Health	  	  
Whether or not glyphosate has carcinogenic potential has been debated since the 
herbicide was initially registered for use in 1985, and changed from the classification “possibly 
carcinogenic to humans” to “evidence of non-carcinogenicity in humans” (Williams, Kroes, and 
Munro 2000). Generally, glyphosate was considered safe partially because it does not pass easily 
through the skin, and it is thought most of the chemical will exit the body following exposure 
(National Pesticide Information Center 2015). However, a significant number of studies 
demonstrating harm caused by glyphosate bring this assumption into question. Over the years, 
questions over glyphosate’s safety are periodically raised. Prior to the IARC conclusions about 
the probable carcinogenicity of glyphosate, in 2011 there was an outbreak of public concern after 
glyphosate was linked to birth defects in low dosage animal studies in a comprehensive review 
published by Earth Open Source (Graves 2011) (Antoniou et al. 2011).  
Overall, the conclusion a study comes to about the carcinogenicity of glyphosate is 
influenced by where the study came from and how it was funded. Generally, studies following 
strict laboratory guidelines that are funded or collected by industry deny glyphosate’s 
carcinogenic potential. Studies produced by academic sources or independent agencies tend to 
observe mid to high potential for glyphosate to be carcinogenic, with some exceptions. Reports 
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from independent agencies reviewing the literature on glyphosate have generally come to the 
conclusion that glyphosate has a high potential for harm, and there is a need for additional 
studies testing it’s carcinogenic potential in humans (IARC 2015) (Myers et al. 2016).  
Glyphosate	  as	  a	  Human	  Carcinogen	  
Empirical data on glyphosate and human health has primarily been gathered from the 
Agricultural Health Study. This study is the primary (but not sole) cohort study to publish 
findings on exposure to glyphosate and cancer risk at many different sites, and was used by both 
IARC and the EPA in considerations regarding glyphosate. The Agricultural Health Study is 
conducted in North Carolina and Iowa and follows licensed pesticide applicators, which includes 
a high number of participants working in agriculture. The study methods include multiple 
questionnaires about farming, personal pesticide use, and other lifestyle factors, like smoking 
habits. The study also collects buccal DNA samples by mail from cheek swabs (“About the 
Study” 2016). While the Agricultural Health Study did find some correlation between glyphosate 
and non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma (NHL), ultimately the researchers declared a null finding due to 
the relationship not reaching statistical significance. This study’s evaluation of glyphosate has 
been criticized for only having a follow up time six to seven years, which is likely not long 
enough for people to actually develop cancer (Portier et al. 2016).  
Other occupational case-control studies in the United States, Canada, and Sweden found 
glyphosate exposure does in fact increase one’s likelihood of getting non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma 
(De Roos et al. 2003) (McDuffie et al. 2001) (Eriksson et al. 2008). A study titled “Integrative 
assessment of multiple pesticides as risk factors for non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma among men” by 
De Roos and others pooled the data from three different case-control studies done in Nebraska, 
Iowa, and Minnesota on non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma. In analyzing the presented data, the 
researchers conclude there is a link between glyphosate exposure and non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma 
(De Roos et al. 2003).  
In June of 2015, researchers Ellen Chang and Elizabeth Dezell completed a meta-analysis 
and systematic review on the literature of glyphosate and non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma. They came 
to the conclusion that there is a statistically significant association between any glyphosate use 
and non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma. This study reviews original scientific articles in the field of 
epidemiology that include a numerical ratio between individual level glyphosate exposure and 
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likelihood of having non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma, Hodgkin’s Lymphoma, Multiple Myloma, or 
Leukemia, leading them to examine 19 articles in total (Chang and Delzell 2016).   
Glyphosate	  and	  Tissue	  Damage	  
 Numerous studies on the affects of glyphosate on lab rats and mice have demonstrated 
glyphosate’s ability to cause deleterious effects. A study performed by Aloísio Benedetti and 
others titled, “The effects of sub-chronic exposure of Wistar rats to the herbicide Glyphosate-
Biocarb®,” was reviewed by both IARC and the EPA (Benedetti et al. 2004). When exposing 
rats to low levels of glyphosate, Benedetti and others observed minor liver injury as well as 
effects on connective tissue and enhanced amounts of reticulin, a structural protein that is found 
in connective tissue and around nerve and muscle fibers (Benedetti et al. 2004). Seeing effects 
from such tests indicate the chemical is changing key functions in the body. These effects are 
seen in response to low levels of glyphosate, indicating the need to clarify the amount of harm 
glyphosate can cause at very real exposure levels and re-examine chronic reference doses that are 
high in the U.S. compared to other countries (Myers et al. 2016). Other animal studies have 
found glyphosate exposure positively associated with renal tubule carcinoma, a type of kidney 
cancer, hemangiosarcoma, a type of canine cancer, and pancreatic islet-cell adenoma, a type of 
cancer that occurs in the pancreas (Chang and Delzell 2016).  
Glyphosate	  as	  an	  Endocrine	  Disruptor	  
In-vitro studies (“within the glass”– meaning studies not performed on live animals, but 
on cells or biological molecules) have indicated that glyphosate can be an endocrine disruptor, 
specifically through disrupting numerous steroidal hormones, which has consequences in 
development for vertebrates. These	  effects can occur at low levels, similar to levels the pesticide 
could be found in the environment and people could plausibly be exposed to (Myers et al. 2016). 
Other in-vitro studies testing the potential for glyphosate to be an endocrine disruptor have come 
to similar conclusions, that low levels of glyphosate can be harmful to human cells (Gasnier et al. 
2009). Additionally, a number of studies have implicated that glyphosate can be a neurotoxin at 
low levels, however this connection requires additional research in order to be fully determined 
(Myers et al. 2016).  
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Need	  For	  Additional	  Data	  
Fully understanding the impacts of glyphosate on human health is imperative at a time 
when use of the weedkiller is skyrocketing. Now that there is a heightened level of concern about 
glyphosate people are starting to test for it in products in which one would not expect to find 
glyphosate. For example, glyphosate was recently detected in the MMRII child vaccine, which is 
highly concerning as glyphosate has not been tested for safety as an injectable, not to mention 
the danger of exposing developing children to a potential endocrine disruptor through such a 
direct route (Honeycutt 2016).8 Additionally, assigning cancer as a health impact of a chemical is 
difficult, given the delayed response that is the nature of the disease. Also, because cancer can be 
the result of an accumulation of exposures an individual receives throughout their lifetime, it is 
difficult to come to clear proof of the carcinogenic potential of a single agent. To enhance the 
literature on glyphosate’s carcinogenic potential, further occupational studies on human 
glyphosate exposure are needed, especially studies looking at chemical manufacturers that work 
with glyphosate. Currently, there are no epidemiological occupational studies on chemical 
manufacture workers who receive a high dose of glyphosate in performing their occupational 
duties. This population would provide a clear examination of the health effects of glyphosate at a 
high dose, higher than that faced by agriculture workers, with fewer confounding factors.  
Literature	  Comparing	  IARC’s	  Process	  With	  the	  Regulatory	  Process	  
An article by Chris Portier and others written in response to the IARC conclusion breaks 
down why the methods of IARC are superior to those of the European Food Safety Authority 
(EFSA), which concluded glyphosate was not carcinogenic after conducting a review of 
registration in late 2015. Portier’s study compared direct wording from each report, to examine 
the differences in conclusion. Portier and other scientists draw comparisons to how IARC and 
EFSA evaluated the data, and conclude EFSA incorrectly dismissed important evidence of 
glyphosate’s carcinogenic potential. The authors also stress the need for EFSA to be more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8 Glyphosate has been detected in vaccines likely because some vaccine agents are grown on pig fat. 
Allowable tolerances for glyphosate on animal feed are almost four hundred times more than is allowed 
on other crops, which means there is a chance these pigs have ingested glyphosate, and it is showing up in 
their fat, and then in the vaccines (Honeycutt 2016). 	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transparent by citing where they got their information for the report, given the drastic potential 
health impacts of glyphosate. 
The first comparison this article draws is over both agencies’ conclusions on glyphosate 
and Non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma. IARC found evidence of correlation between glyphosate and 
Non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma based on available human evidence, while EFSA “classified the 
available evidence as limited and then dismissed any association of glyphosate with cancer 
without justification or explanation” (Portier et al. 2016). The next differing conclusion is over 
the significance of animal studies. The IARC working group found sufficient evidence for 
carcinogenicity in lab animals based on the studies it evaluated, while EFSA dismissed three 
studies showing renal tumors in mice, malignant lymphoma in two mice studies, and 
hemangiosarcoma (a fast growing cancer found almost exclusively in dogs, horses, and cats) in a 
move that went against the established guidelines cited in their report, discarding the studies as 
“chance occurrences” (Portier et al. 2016).  Finally, in addition to being carcinogenic, the IARC 
working group also concluded that glyphosate has genotoxicity and can induce oxidative stress 
based on publicly available DNA studies on exposed humans. EFSA came to this same 
conclusion, however dismissed it as well stating “oxidative stress alone is not sufficient for 
carcinogenic labeling” (Portier et al. 2016). Overall, EFSA “ignored important laboratory and 
human mechanistic evidence of genotoxicity” important for linking glyphosate to serious harm 
(Portier et al. 2016).  
Literature	  Gap	  
Overall, many sources of literature touch on the challenges that exist in banning 
pesticides in the United States, as well as barriers in changing chemical policy as a whole. 
However, this study is the first to combine these primary barriers, and contrast the methods of 
the EPA with those of a highly respected independent international agency. This study fills a gap 
in the literature as an in-depth look at structural failures limiting the EPA’s action on pesticide 
regulation, specific to glyphosate.  
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Methodology	  
Participants	  
In order to determine the primary barriers to banning potentially carcinogenic pesticides, 
this study gathered participants including six experts knowledgeable about glyphosate, pesticide 
regulation in the United States, and IARC’s process. Experts were identified through having 
written recent publications on glyphosate. The experts included two employees at nonprofits who 
have worked on campaigns surrounding glyphosate, a scientist who was in the IARC working 
group that determined glyphosate to be a probable carcinogen, a reporter who is writing a book 
on glyphosate and the policy debate surrounding the chemical, and an expert on GMO’s and 
Monsanto. All participants in this study were recruited over email.  
Materials	  
Informed consent forms were collected from each interviewee. Forms provided the subject 
information about the purpose of the project, the voluntary nature of participation, and the risks 
and benefits of participating. Interviewees also received a copy of the interview questions over 
email prior to the interview.  
Design	  and	  Procedure	  
This research was qualitative and slightly structured. Questions were standardized to enhance 
the rigor of the study, however to capture additional information individual interviewees could 
offer, some interviews extended beyond these core questions. Interviews were conducted over 
the phone, lasted 30 minutes to an hour, and were audio recorded with permission of the 
participant. Examples of interview questions include, “Do you believe it is important for the EPA 
to strengthen regulation of glyphosate? (To what extent, and why?),” “What do you believe are 
the key barriers affecting the EPA’s decision to ban potentially carcinogenic pesticides?” and 
“What is your opinion on the role of the agrochemical industry in the pesticide regulation 
process?” A full list of questions is included in the appendix. 
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Findings	  &	  Analysis	  
There is currently an overreliance on chemical pesticides in the United States, and 
subsequent widespread negative public health and environmental impacts stemming from high 
levels of chemical pesticide use. The danger posed by widespread chemical pesticides to public 
health has been identified in the literature, and has been an ongoing issue since chemical 
pesticides were used on a broad scale, initiated after WWII (Myers et al. 2016). While there is a 
system in place designed to regulate pesticides and protect public health and the environment, 
this system is seriously flawed. Understanding the barriers to more stringent pesticide can 
ultimately guide how to break them down.  
The following section presents the barriers to increased regulation on chemical pesticides. 
Findings are based in interviews with five experts knowledgeable about pesticide regulation in 
the United States and the current issues surrounding glyphosate. These experts include Dr. 
Christopher Portier, a senior scientist who has served on multiple Scientific Advisory Boards for 
the EPA, and was a member of the IARC Review Board for glyphosate, Emily Marquez, a staff 
scientist at the Pesticide Action Network of North America, Carey Gillam, a veteran journalist 
and research director for U.S. Right to Know, Jennifer Sass, a senior scientist in the Health 
Department of the NRDC, and Bill Freese, a Science Policy Analyst at the Center for Food 
Safety. Monsanto was reached for interview, but declined, not wanting to speak on behalf of the 
entire industry. CropLife America was also reached for interview, but declined, not wanting to 
speak about a specific agent, and referred the researcher to Monsanto. Additional online research 
further contributed to the following findings and analysis on the key barriers to stronger 
regulation of carcinogenic pesticides, specifically glyphosate.  
Summary	  of	  Key	  Findings	  
The key barriers to stronger restrictions on potentially carcinogenic pesticides were 
identified by interviews with experts in pesticide regulation in the United States with knowledge 
about glyphosate. Barriers include the wide reach of industry influence in both the formal and 
informal spheres, considering the benefits of pesticides during regulatory processes, systemic 
issues within the Office of Pesticide Programs such as program cuts and growing numbers of 
pesticides to review, only examining active ingredients instead of formulations, and giving too 
much weight to animal studies and not enough to epidemiology studies. Additional barriers 
	   30	  
specific to glyphosate include minimal low cost alternatives, widespread dependence of farmers 
on the herbicide, and errors made in the hazard assessment leading the EPA to not recognize its 
carcinogenic potential paving the way for less stringent regulation.  
Systematic	  Barriers	  Within	  the	  OPP	  of	  the	  EPA	  
The Office of Pesticide Programs (OPP) is the department within the EPA responsible for 
overseeing pesticide regulation. As reported by Carey Gillam, a veteran journalist and research 
director for U.S. Right to Know, recently the OPP has been limited in its abilities due to a 
declining workforce paired with an increase in the number of pesticides to review. A restrained 
budget (of $8 to $10 billion) also makes stronger regulation challenging as the office is stretched 
thin, and more thorough regulation requires additional resources. In addition to these systematic 
issues, the OPP is heavily influenced by industry. All interviewees described both formal and 
informal means by which the agrochemical industry influences the OPP of the EPA, described in 
detail below. Additionally, Christopher Portier, senior scientist who was on the IARC glyphosate 
review board, identified the barrier that the OPP knows that if they regulate a pesticide strictly 
they will receive “significant pushback” from corporations in the form of costly lawsuits, 
whereas unless there is public attention on the specific pesticide (as there is with glyphosate), 
there is no need for the office to “stick their neck out unnecessarily” (Portier 2017).  
Problems	  with	  the	  way	  the	  OPP	  Assesses	  Data	  
Experts interviewed in the data collection phase identified numerous problems with the 
way the OPP assesses data, especially in the case of glyphosate. Portier mentioned the incorrect 
use of statistics by the OPP when analyzing data and the related observation that the EPA does 
not have enough statisticians. Perhaps because of this lack of statisticians, the agency has 
“limited procedures in evaluating data” (Portier 2017). As an example, Portier brought up the 
incorrect use of historical control data that leads to conclusions that undermine the hazard posed 
by glyphosate. Historical control data provides scientists with a tool to compare current studies 
with past studies to see if the study results are exceptionally unusual, but these data need to be 
used very carefully to be sure studies are actually comparable, because if they are not it is invalid 
to draw conclusions from statistical tests using historical controls. Generally, historical controls 
should be used only if there is significant reason to disregard controls from the same study.  
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Along with the need for more statisticians, Emily Marquez of the Pesticide Action 
Network of North America (PANNA) brought up the need for additional epidemiologists in the 
Office of Pesticide Programs (OPP), or at least one. While there are epidemiologists in the EPA, 
none are permanent staff in the OPP. Three other experts mentioned this point as well. Marquez 
described how having scientists of different disciplines helps the agency come to a more 
complete understanding of the meaning of each study and therefore get the best results, as 
scientists with different backgrounds have specialized training and can interpret results 
differently.  
Another issue within data assessment methods of the EPA identified by experts is when 
the EPA does not follow its own guidelines when conducting hazard assessments. The cancer 
assessment guidelines that exist are valuable and help ensure the stringency and consistency of 
reports. The guidelines cover both how lab animals should be tested to ensure the examination 
only covers properly performed studies, as well as how the EPA should analyze study results, 
such as the types of statistical tests to perform and most importantly how they should decide 
whether they will classify an agent they are reviewing as “unlikely,” “possible,” “probable,” or 
“likely” to cause cancer.  In the case of glyphosate, the EPA did not follow some of the 
guidelines in a way that led them to dismiss key studies linking glyphosate to carcinogenic 
effects. Bill Freese of the Center for Food Safety asserts that if the EPA were to follow it’s own 
guidelines it would find glyphosate to be probably carcinogenic.  
Only	  Examine	  Active	  Ingredients	  
 As mentioned previously, when regulating pesticides, the EPA only takes the active 
ingredient proposed by the chemical company into account. Three different experts interviewed 
discussed how only examining the active ingredient is a barrier to stronger regulation because 
inactive ingredients play a substantial role in determining the toxicity of a formulation. Multiple 
sources of evidence demonstrate that inactive ingredients can make solvents more toxic. Freese 
mentioned that it is possible the EPA may not have the resources to test all formulations and 
mixtures of chemicals, but doing so is an important aspect of determining the hazards associated 
with exposure to a pesticide. The difference in toxicity between active ingredients and 
formulations has been demonstrated in studies comparing glyphosate with Roundup (Mesnage et 
al. 2014). This exclusion is an important barrier because if the OPP were to examine Roundup as 
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a formulation, the results of a thorough risk assessment would likely find a higher level of risk 
than is posed by glyphosate alone, which would ideally lead to further regulation (observed 
through a lower acceptable dose level and restricted usage). When regulators test glyphosate 
alone it does not go far enough in considering the impacts the chemical has on public health. 
Not	  Enough	  Input	  From	  Independent	  Agencies	  
Four out of five interviewees mentioned the need for further incorporation of input from 
independent agencies in the determination of the health effects of a pesticide, as well as 
additional research performed by independent agencies. Numerous interviewees suggested 
corporations need to contract research that is independent and not concerned with pleasing 
industry interests, as is often the case now. Gillam mentioned the need for more independent 
research overall and the need for additional grants that support chemical safety research. 
Independent research would supply the EPA with further studies to review aside from those 
produced by industry, which make up the clear majority when it comes to animal studies.  
 The incorporation of independent research is especially important due to the conflicts of 
interest created by the fact that the majority of animal studies considered in developing human 
safety standards come from industry or industry sponsored scientists. Toxicology study standards 
that are widely accepted by regulatory agencies are set up in a way that exclude peer reviewed 
academic studies from consideration. These studies are required to follow strict guidelines 
(different from cancer assessment guidelines). While the guidelines do help promote responsible 
data collection and replicable tests, Sass mentioned the role of Good Laboratory Practices (GLP) 
guidelines in blocking academic studies from consideration in certain phases of the regulatory 
process. Excluding academia is problematic because numerous studies have demonstrated that 
following study methods other than those laid out by GLP can actually lead to more sensitive 
toxicity testing (Buonsante et al. 2014). Analyzing studies that are more sensitive to detecting 
toxicity could lead to stricter human safety standards if a chemical is thought to be more of a risk 
or hazard.  
Improper	  Weighting	  of	  Animal	  Studies	  over	  Epidemiological	  Studies	  
As part of the hazard assessment process, the EPA gives greater weight to “high quality 
and well documented studies and those findings confirmed by multiple sources” and takes this 
weight into account when analyzing the available data (OECA US EPA 2006). Portier and 
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Freese stress that the EPA gives too much relative weight to animal studies when analyzing 
available data during a hazard assessment. Freese mentioned the conflict of interest posed by the 
heavy reliance on animal studies produced by the registrant or contracted firms. Freese, Portier, 
and Marquez all spoke to the subsequent need to give more weight to epidemiology studies. 
Epidemiology studies deserve more weight because they encompass the actual human response 
instead of the response of rats or mice, which involves making “fairly wide extrapolations” 
(Freese 2017). Additionally, epidemiology studies inherently look at the actual pesticide 
formulation instead of solely the active ingredient. Finally, epidemiology studies are important 
because they are generally produced by independent scientists instead of industry-contracted 
scientists like most of the animal studies. In 2014, the National Research Council created a report 
detailing recommendations on how the EPA could improve the risk assessment process, and 
incorporating epidemiology studies was one of their suggestions (Samet 2014). In the current 
draft hazard assessment of glyphosate, the EPA considers epidemiology studies, however 
multiple interviewees believe they dismissed important results too readily, supposedly due to the 
inability to rule out confounding factors.  
OPP	  Aligns	  With	  Industry	  Interests	  
Three out of five experts brought up the inherently conservative nature of the Office of 
Pesticide Programs in relation to the rest of the EPA as a barrier to stricter pesticide regulation. 
Portier mentioned how the OPP leans towards industry influence, and Marquez talked about the 
attitude of the OPP being more about processing and registering as many products as possible if 
they don’t find a negative effect because each chemical agent primarily represents a “job to get 
done” (Marquez 2017). Similarly, Jennifer Sass, senior scientist in the health program of the 
NRDC, talked about how OPP has been known to express pride over the speedy approval of 
pesticides. Sass considered the possibility the OPP office could be more tolerant to industry 
because of its history as the USDA before the EPA was created, which could lead to an ingrained 
connection with agriculture interests.  
Industry	  Barriers	  
Industry poses the greatest barrier to stronger pesticide regulation, according to the 
experts interviewed. Industry influence comes from a mix of formal and informal roles the 
industry plays in nearly every stage of the pesticide regulation process (summarized in Figure 4). 
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Overall, as Sass explained, “the EPA treats industry as an honest broker,” but they need to 
recognize that it is the EPA’s job to regulate, not Monsanto’s (Sass 2017). The industry is doing 
what we would expect them to do, which generally translates to trying to maximize profits (Yoon 
2006).  
Figure	  4:	  Roles	  of	  Industry	  in	  the	  Pesticide	  Regulation	  Process	  	  
 
Formal	  Industry	  Role	  as	  a	  Barrier	  	   Providing background science and lobbying are the primary formal roles the 
agrochemical industry plays in the regulatory process. The Federal Insecticide, Rodenticide, and 
Fungicide Act (FIRFA) calls for the EPA to retrieve initial information on the safety of a 
chemical from the company registering the pesticide for use, therefore setting up the use of 
industry science to guide the regulatory process (as the results of this initial review determine 
whether or not a pesticide requires further testing). Interviewees acknowledged this as a sensible 
step for the preliminary review as public dollars shouldn’t fund the testing of private companies 
products for safety. However, in terms of using industry science in other periods of the 
regulation process, both Gillam and Marquez discussed the bias that is implicit when studies 
come from industry, because they are apt to come out in favor of whatever is being tested. 
Marquez and Sass both mentioned the impact of strict requirements that determine what studies 
are eligible to be examined, that ultimately lead to the exclusion of academic and independent 
studies. Portier and Freese felt differently. They felt that the guidelines help keep studies more 
accurate and stringent. Portier pointed out that while the studies commissioned by industry are 
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generally quite rigorous, and follow impossibly strict guidelines that do help keep the studies 
very controlled, academic studies that are not as rigorous should not be dismissed entirely or 
given less weight in regulatory considerations.  
 In addition to toxicology studies that follow strict guidelines, industry contracts 
additional studies by paying independent scientists. When corporations in the agrochemical 
industry contract scientists to produce studies from them, they ultimately impact the scientists’ 
results through working with the researchers directly and suggesting method and data analysis 
strategies. Multiple interviewees mentioned the need for industry-sponsored science to be more 
independent from industry influence. According to Dr. Cresswell, a scientist who worked for 
Syngenta and was interviewed in depth by the New York Times in an article about industry 
influence on scientific results, “It wasn’t conniving on my part, but absolutely [Syngenta] 
influenced what I ended up doing on the project” (Hakim 2016). Dr. Cresswell also said that 
while Syngenta was not necessarily blatant in asking him to come up with specific results, they 
“Syngenta clearly has got an agenda” (Hakim 2016). Dr. Cresswell reported initially coming to 
results that did not support the conclusions Syngenta was looking for, and in emails they asked 
him to redo the study considering different data and using a new approach. When he did this, Dr. 
Creswell came to results that backed Syngenta’s desired outcome.  
Through having the scientists sign nondisclosure agreements and confidentiality 
agreements, the corporation essentially owns all rights to the data produced with industry 
funding, and the scientists are not allowed to release the results independently. This essentially 
means the corporation controls what data they fund gets released to regulatory agencies and to 
the public, since scientists doing research for them would be breaking their contract by doing so. 
Industry controlled science imposes a significant barrier to stricter pesticide regulation, because 
when regulatory agencies are reviewing scientific data in order to make regulatory decisions, if 
there are not as many studies showing harm as there are showing lack of harm, it is ultimately 
going to influence how pesticides are regulated. This clear influence over scientific results 
supports the literature on the subject, specifically the 2010 study by Diels and others, that 
observes a trend in industry funding and results that favor industry interests (Diels et al. 2010). 
As a large portion of the science reviewed by the EPA and the Scientific Advisory Panel is 
affected by industry influence, any decision they come to based on this scientific evidence will 
be too. 
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Lobbying the EPA is another way the agrochemical industry gets involved officially in 
the pesticide regulation process. Two important lobbying groups that represent agrochemical 
interests include CropLife America and the American Chemical Council. Portier, Marquez, 
Gillam, and Freese all mentioned heavy lobbying by industry to the EPA as a factor that gives 
industry too much influence in the regulatory process. In late 2016, CropLife America lobbied 
the EPA and successfully influenced the membership of the Scientific Advisory Panel (SAP) for 
glyphosate through requesting the removal of a key epidemiologist, even though he did not have 
any financial conflicts of interest or seemingly valid reason to be removed. CropLife argued that 
he should be removed because he had made prior statements about his belief that glyphosate was 
a dangerous chemical, which threatened Monsanto’s hope that the SAP would agree with the 
EPA’s draft assessment that glyphosate is not a probable carcinogen. This recent event 
demonstrates the direct influence industry lobbying can have on important regulatory processes.   
Informal	  Industry	  Role	  as	  a	  Barrier	  
In addition to formal influences, the agrochemical industry also influences the EPA, and 
specifically the OPP, through informal means. Marquez described that through working closely, 
scientists from agrochemical companies, or firms contracted by them, develop relationships with 
regulatory scientists. Portier mentioned the potential impact of talk forums on industry’s 
scientific influence, specifically those put on three times a year by International Life Sciences 
Institute. On the International Life Sciences Institute website, one can find the quote, 
“Membership in ILSI North America provides the opportunity to develop new research 
knowledge and to interpret and assess the status of current scientific issues through the large 
network of academia, industry, and government experts in diverse areas of food science, 
nutrition, safety, and risk assessment” (“Membership” 2017). Portier, however, noted that these 
meetings are attended primarily by regulators, regulatory scientists, and scientists from the food 
industry. A quick scroll through a list of the members of ILSI confirms this statement 
(“Membership” 2017). Events like these tri-annual talk forums further strengthen relationships 
and foster the sharing of ideas between industry and regulatory scientists. Such a connection 
between regulators and independent or academic scientists is more limited, according to Portier. 
Additionally, Sass mentioned that when visiting the EPA headquarters, the sign-in sheet alone 
displays the disproportionate presence of industry representatives.  
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Freese and Portier identified the difficulty in establishing a clear link between the 
agrochemical industry and the influence corporations exert, because the trail of funding and 
power can get complicated when accounting for NGO’s that are funded by industry or lobbying 
groups like the American Chemical Council, scientists who get paid off by industry, and personal 
relationships that are not easy or even possible to track. Additionally, according to Portier, 
industry even can contribute to forming how the press talks about scientific issues through 
providing courses and forums to “help” journalists describe scientific issues when they come up, 
such as IARC’s listing of glyphosate as a probable carcinogen that made headlines worldwide.  
The role of informal EPA-industry relations in influencing pesticide regulation outcomes 
is exemplified in recent drama over Jess Rowland, a senior OPP official who recently stepped 
down, and his relations with Monsanto. Evidence of potential conflicts of interest came forth 
during the ongoing lawsuits against Monsanto brought on by more than 60 people with Non-
Hodgkin’s Lymphoma who are suing Monsanto for covering up evidence that glyphosate could 
cause cancer. Thirty different cases were combined in a federal trial based in San Francisco. 
Documents from this case have been made public, and bring into scrutiny the relationship 
between EPA staff and Monsanto in regards to covering up glyphosate’s potential to cause harm.  
As Carey Gillam states in a Huffington Post article, “Mr. Rowland operated under 
Monsanto’s influence to cause EPA’s position and publications to support Monsanto’s business” 
(Gillam 2017c). Email correspondence between Rowland and a former longtime EPA employee 
suggest staff at the agency were aware of glyphosate’s carcinogenic properties in 2013, with the 
other employee telling Rowland, “It is almost certain glyphosate causes cancer… the CARC 
category [for glyphosate] should be changed to ‘probable human carcinogen’” (Gillam 2017c). 
However, Rowland was the chair of the CARC committee that reviewed glyphosate and declared 
it “unlikely to be a carcinogen.” Plaintiffs in the lawsuit are arguing that Rowland had a “highly 
suspicious” relationship with Monsanto. Court records also show that Rowland warned 
Monsanto about the IARC conclusion on glyphosate months before it was released to the public, 
which meant Monsanto was able to prepare a “public relations assault” (Hakim 2017). In further 
details released during this case, the vice president of Monsanto’s global strategy reportedly said 
during a phone conversation, “It’s not an effort to manipulate the system” (Rosenblatt, Mulvany, 
and Waldman 2017). After the release of these documents, the courts are putting further 
investigation into Monsanto’s influence in the regulatory process (Gillam 2017a).  
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Consideration	  of	  Benefits	  as	  a	  Barrier	  
When regulating pesticides, the EPA is required by the Federal Insecticide, Rodenticide, 
and Fungicide Act (FIRFA) and the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) to consider the 
benefits of a pesticide and the costs of removing it from the market. This requirement differs 
from the guidelines of other environmental acts, such as the Clean Air Act, which prohibits the 
consideration of benefits in coming to regulatory decisions (Cropper et al. 1992). Consideration 
of benefits includes the monetary cost to consumers and producers of banning a pesticide from 
use on a particular crop. The consideration of benefits in the review and registration process for 
pesticides can lead to skewed considerations towards industry interests, especially now that the 
entire system of agriculture is heavily reliant on chemical fertilizers and pesticides, which 
increases the benefits to keeping them on the market. Based on the literature, the required 
consideration of benefits by the EPA when registering a pesticide for use poses an important 
barrier to stricter pesticide regulation. The consideration of benefits embedded in pesticide 
regulation leads to decisions that can place higher importance on monetary costs of removing a 
pesticide from the market than the potentially devastating public health implications of allowing 
widespread exposure (Cropper et al. 1992).  
Lack	  of	  Alternatives	  as	  a	  Barrier	  
An additional barrier to removing chemical pesticides from the market is the lack of 
development and research on, or attempts to integrate nontoxic alternatives (Wilson and 
Schwarzman 2009). Gillam pointed out this barrier, and called for the need to develop a space 
for safe alternatives. There is a need for additional investment in cleaner and safer chemical 
alternatives and technologies, the field known as “green chemistry” (Wilson and Schwarzman 
2009). Currently, there is significant difficulty associated with changing a well-established, 
complex system that is engrained in this country’s system of food production. The lack of safe, 
effective, and inexpensive alternatives to chemical pesticides is a significant barrier, because 
without them, farmer demand for pesticides will remain high, and removing chemical pesticides 
from the market will continue to have a high associated cost if there is not a cheap alternative to 
replace said chemical. 
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Barriers	  Specific	  to	  Glyphosate	  
Glyphosate is different from other pesticides because of the high market demand for the 
chemical and the centralized nature of the profits glyphosate brings to Monsanto. According to 
Gillam, farmers loved glyphosate when it was first introduced because it was cheap and easy, but 
now due to more and more crops developing glyphosate resistance they “still feel like glyphosate 
is important and don’t want to lose it, but they wished they had something better” (Gillam 
2017b). Glyphosate resistance does not necessarily mean pesticide users will voluntarily phase 
out glyphosate, but so far is leading to glyphosate being combined with other chemicals 
increasing the strength and potential toxicity of the widely used herbicide. Companies are 
coming up with new mixtures of herbicides, such as Dow Chemical’s EnlistDuo that combines 
glyphosate combined with 2,4-D, a chemical that was a component of the infamous Agent 
Orange used during the Vietnam War.  
As Gillam mentioned, glyphosate is the “bread and butter” for Monsanto, especially 
because of their popular Roundup Ready seeds, which bring in the highest profits (Gillam 
2017b). Due to the high profits Monsanto receives from glyphosate products, the corporation is 
putting high levels of pressure on the EPA. The lawsuits brought on by people with NHL 
increase Monsanto’s determination to ensure glyphosate is regarded as safe, because they are 
concerned that they will not only lose their key product, but also that these lawsuits will, 
according to Portier, “continue to pile on” (Portier 2017). If Monsanto can get the hazard 
assessment to say glyphosate is not a carcinogen, they will be able to influence how glyphosate 
is considered in the full risk assessment due to be published in the upcoming year.  
As the results of the draft hazard assessment are important for informing the full risk 
assessment, it is troubling that Portier, Sass, and Freese all feel strongly that the EPA did not 
perform the draft hazard assessment of glyphosate correctly, particularly because they did not 
follow their own cancer assessment guidelines. The Scientific Advisory Panel (SAP) did not 
come to a consensus about the status of glyphosate as a carcinogen, however they concluded that 
the EPA failed to properly separate hazard and risk. As described by multiple experts, EPA 
guidelines state that a hazard assessment solely should assess whether or not a chemical has the 
potential to cause unreasonable harm, which differs from a risk assessment that considers the 
hazard potential along with potential exposure levels. Sass called the current assessment 
“bologna” and said it was “basically negotiated with Monsanto” (Sass 2017). Freese sees this 
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assessment as a key problem blocking stricter regulation of glyphosate, as determining the 
chemical is harmful is the first step along the path to stronger regulation. Industry influence at 
this step (removing key epidemiologist from the panel, delaying the process by months over 
multiple issues) has the potential to lead to poor outcomes for public health.  
Gillam believes while stricter regulation of glyphosate is important, “there’s not a chance 
in hell they’re going to ban glyphosate in the United States” (Gillam 2017b). Gillam sees more 
of a possibility for a glyphosate ban in Europe, especially because regulatory guidelines are 
different and when an agent is identified as a carcinogen it is required to be phased out, because 
carcinogens have no threshold for causing harm. Lack of optimism about the fate of glyphosate 
regulation in the United States can stem from the culture and political history surrounding 
pesticides in this country.  
 
Figure	  5:	  Themes	  Addressed	  by	  Interviewees	  	  
Most	  common	  themes	  identified	   Interviewees	  who	  spoke	  to	  theme	  
Industry	  plays	  too	  big	  of	  a	  role	  and	  influences	  regulatory	  
processes	  
All	  
The	  EPA	  is	  not	  conducting	  a	  proper	  risk	  assessment	  with	  
glyphosate	  because	  of	  the	  failure	  to	  separate	  hazard	  from	  
risk	  
Sass,	  Gillam,	  Portier,	  Freese	  
Important	  that	  glyphosate	  undergoes	  a	  full	  risk	  
assessment	  because	  its	  use	  is	  so	  widespread	  
Marquez,	  Gillam,	  Sass	  
OPP	  has	  always	  been	  more	  in	  touch	  with	  industry	  interests	  
than	  public	  health	  interests	  
Sass,	  Gillam,	  Marquez	  	  
Only	  testing	  the	  active	  ingredient	  does	  not	  present	  the	  full	  
picture	  
Sass,	  Freese	  
Epidemiology	  studies	  are	  not	  given	  enough	  weight	   Sass,	  Freese,	  Marquez	  	  
EPA	  assessment	  shouldn’t	  differ	  so	  significantly	  from	  that	  
of	  an	  independent	  agency	  (IARC)	  
Freese,	  Sass	  
EPA	  assessment	  relies	  too	  heavily	  on	  animal	  studies	  
(which	  produces	  a	  conflict	  of	  interest)	  
Sass,	  Marquez,	  Freese	  
Studies	  informing	  regulatory	  decisions	  should	  be	  done	  by	  
independent	  firms	  
Freese,	  Gillam,	  Sass	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IARC’s	  Listing	  of	  Glyphosate	  Demonstrating	  Barriers	  in	  OPP	  Process	  
IARC’s	  Process	  For	  Determining	  Carcinogens	  
 As mentioned previously, IARC’s process for producing reports involves gathering a 
group of ad hoc international scientists that have substantial expertise and no conflicts of interest 
(IARC 2015). The review considers studies and documents that are publicly available, which 
leads to the exclusion of industry studies that are not made public due to “Confidential Business 
Information” (Portier et al. 2016). Instead of taking the results of each study they review at face 
value, the selected team of scientists makes their own conclusions based on the evidence 
presented. For example, if the authors of a toxicology study state there is no evidence of 
carcinogenicity, yet the IARC scientists believe the results do show evidence of carcinogenicity, 
they will use their own conclusions over the authors (Pollack 2015). When establishing a link to 
cancer, IARC uses four levels of evidence: sufficient evidence, limited evidence, inadequate 
evidence, and evidence suggesting lack of carcinogenicity (Cogliano).  
IARC	  Process	  Contrasted	  With	  EPA	  Process	  
The process of a hazard assessment is similar to IARC’s process, in that both agencies 
consider a wide range of studies, give them different weights for how strongly they will consider 
the studies in the analysis, and after reviewing all the studies they come to a conclusion about 
whether or not the agent is a carcinogen. As hazard assessments are fundamentally similar to 
IARC’s monographs determining carcinogenic potential, it is confusing that regulatory agencies 
are coming to different conclusions about glyphosate from independent agencies. The 
independent IARC review of glyphosate can help point out where the OPP was perhaps too 
conservative in their analysis of the data. Comparing the two processes is a useful tool in 
determining the barriers within the OPP to coming to hazard assessment conclusions (that an 
agent is harmful) that would lead to stronger regulation. Multiple experts pointed to this 
discrepancy as a sign the OPP is overly captured by industry, as the main difference is how the 
agencies weight the studies (the EPA gives more weight to industry produced animal studies than 
IARC) and the EPA dismissed multiple important studies demonstrating glyphosate’s harm on 
bases experts feel is incorrect.  
A key difference between the two agencies originates from the actual data they review. 
As mentioned previously, IARC scientists look at publicly available research, which excludes 
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industry studies, while in assessing animal studies, the OPP additionally considers a high volume 
of industry studies. While there are many scientific studies examining the safety of glyphosate, 
few meet the requirements for strong consideration from both agencies, therefore many of the 
studies reviewed by IARC were also reviewed by the OPP. However, the OPP dismissed many 
of the key studies incriminating glyphosate that IARC examined. This dismissal is an important 
point of contention, because some experts feel OPP dismissed studies unreasonably, without 
evaluating the potentially important information the studies contained (Portier et al. 2016). 
Studies dismissed by the OPP include animal studies with doses higher than 1,000 mg/kg/day, on 
the basis that it is not reflective of realistic human doses. Additional studies were dismissed that 
did not show a dose response curve that correlated with increased dose increasing the adverse 
health impact (know as a monotonic dose response relationship). Epidemiology study results 
were dismissed due to the inability to rule out recall bias. Experts believe there were valuable 
points in the epidemiology studies that were too readily discounted. In contrast, IARC scientists 
looked at all of the available data, evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of each study they 
analyzed, so they did not miss important indicators of the danger of glyphosate. An additional 
difference includes OPP’s use of historical control data, which according to Freese seems to be 
used to discount studies that otherwise would have presented significance supporting the 
carcinogenic potential of glyphosate. In summary, IARC differs from the OPP through 
considering only publicly available literature and not industry produced studies, not considering 
dose, dismissing fewer studies, using historical controls differently, and evaluating strengths and 
weaknesses of all available data. 
Response	  to	  the	  IARC	  study	  
The IARC monograph sparked a wide global response, from regulating agencies of 
countries, states, and cities, the media, agrochemical companies, and individuals using it as 
grounds to sue. IARC’s conclusion opened up the conversation about glyphosate’s safety in a 
worldwide setting.  
 Industry interests, namely Monsanto, responded to the IARC conclusion with outrage. 
Soon after the IARC report was released, Monsanto released a statement reading, “Based on the 
overwhelming weight of evidence, Monsanto strongly disagrees with IARC’s classification of 
glyphosate” (“IARC’s Report on Glyphosate” 2015). Monsanto representatives further claim the 
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IARC study is inconsistent with the determination of regulatory agencies around the world, and 
argue the IARC study should not be “sound basis” for regulatory action (“IARC’s Report on 
Glyphosate” 2016). Throughout 2016, Monsanto undertook efforts to discredit IARC scientists, 
and even seeking to pull American Cancer Society funding from IARC in response to the 
monograph (Gillam 2016c). This strong reaction came as a surprise to many involved in the 
report, who are not used to having their highly distinguished credentials questioned (Gillam 
2016c). 
Numerous regulatory agencies, including the European Food Safety Authority and 
Canada’s Pest Management Agency, reviewed the safety of glyphosate after the IARC listing. 
While the regulatory agency of the European Union came to the conclusion that glyphosate is 
safe, they set the safe dose to a level much lower than it currently is in the United States (Myers 
et al. 2016). While previously citing glyphosate’s safety as a reason for not testing its presence 
on food products, the FDA responded to the IARC conclusion and subsequent increased concern 
over glyphosate by starting to test common food items for glyphosate content (Gilham 2016). 
The FDA found glyphosate in products like SueBee honey and Quaker Oats, but the process has 
been put on pause since November of 2016 (Gillam 2016d). According to Gillam, Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) documents show that Monsanto suspiciously called the FDA just before 
testing of glyphosate was paused, in a possible demonstration of industry influence in federal 
processes. Independent groups, however, continued to test foods for glyphosate content, and 
found glyphosate in Ritz crackers, General Mills’ Cheerios, Kellog’s Special K cereal, and Kashi 
oatmeal cookies (Gillam 2016a) (Gillam 2016c).  
The California Office of Environmental Health Hazards Assessment (OEHHA) 
responded to the IARC monograph by listing glyphosate as a carcinogen to be labeled under 
Prop 65, the state law requiring warning signs when there is risked exposure to potentially 
carcinogenic chemicals (Plume 2016). Since the IARC report came out, several countries, cities, 
and towns have banned or severely restricted the use of glyphosate or Roundup. Individual 
countries including France, Belgium, Sweden, El Salvador, Bermuda, and the Netherlands, are 
moving to ban glyphosate based on the IARC determination. Cities and towns restricting 
glyphosate use include Malibu, Richmond, and Fairfax in California, Reno, Nevada, Boulder, 
Colorado, and Glastonbury in the UK (“Glyphosate and Pesticide Bans around the World as of 
July 2016” 2016).  
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Recommendations	  
Given the environmental health problems associated with high levels of chemical 
pesticide use, including cancer, birth defects, developmental delays and more, the need exists to 
change U.S. pesticide policy in order to lower levels of chemical pesticides in the environment. 
In theory, the current system for regulating pesticides is complete and effectively protects human 
health while encouraging development in the field of pest and weed management. However, 
significant flaws in the system impact the decisions made by the EPA (particularly the OPP 
within the EPA) and lead to lapses in regulation in ways that support industry and fail public 
health and the environment. The following recommendations propose a step in the direction of 
human and environmental health protection, however ultimately the removal of toxic pesticides 
from use as a pest management strategy is the only way to have an agricultural system that is 
sustainable in the long term.  
Many of the following recommendations will be difficult to accomplish with the Trump 
administration’s emphasis on limiting regulations within the EPA. This is exemplified in the 
recent decision made by Scott Pruitt, the current EPA administrator appointed by Trump, to 
reject a petition to ban chlorpyrifos, an organophosphate insecticide identified as a 
developmental neurotoxin (US EPA Media Relations 2017). Particularly, amending the Federal 
Insecticide, Rodenticide, and Fungicide Act (FIRFA) in ways that will put further restrictions on 
industry will be unlikely to pass in Congress with the current Republican majority, due to 
patterns of industry-friendly behavior (Sneed 2017) (Dennis and Mufson 2017).  The proposed 
43% cut to the EPA budget and laying off of 25% of the agency’s employees is a significant 
barrier posed by the new administration in terms of accomplishing the following 
recommendations, especially in terms expanding funding programs and hiring additional staffers 
(Eilperin, Mooney, and Mufson 2017). Nonetheless, the following recommendations are 
important for drafting proposed changes in legislation, planning for funding changes, and 
incorporating practices for nonprofits.  
Amend	  FIRFA	  to	  Decrease	  Chemical	  Industry	  Influence	  
As a long-term goal, FIRFA must be amended in order to ensure fair and complete 
examinations of the carcinogenic potential of chemical pesticides. Such amendments should 
work to cut industry control over the science informing regulatory decisions. Members of the 
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House and Senate who support decisions based on unbiased science guiding regulation of 
potentially harmful pesticides should support amending FIRFA. FIRFA requires every pesticide 
distributed, sold, and used in the United States to first be approved for use by the EPA, based on 
the determination that it does not cause any unreasonable adverse effects, and lays out directions 
for this registration process (EPA).  
In order to lessen the influence of industry, FIRFA must be amended to require the results 
of studies examining an agent they regulate to be sent directly to the EPA, and contracted with 
entirely independent firms. While it is necessary for chemical companies to fund the science 
backing initial pesticide registration requests (because using public funds for this would be using 
public funds to help companies get chemical products registered for use), the client based 
relationship of such studies can be changed by shifting the EPA to the group contracting the 
science, while industry is funding it. This way, industry will have less of an influence on the 
results of independent scientists’ studies than they do currently, as exemplified by the New York 
Times expose on the scientist in England working for Syngenta discussed in the Findings section 
of this paper.  
Further amending FIRFA could modify the current system to allow for the consideration 
of formulations, instead of only examining the active ingredients, as FIRFA sets the basic 
guidelines for how regulatory testing proceeds. As there are thousands of different formulations 
on the market and testing all formulations would present too heavy a burden for the OPP, this 
adjustment could start by requiring only the consideration of the top ten most applied pesticide 
formulations currently on the market (adjusted over the years to account for market shifts). This 
adjustment to FIRFA would help solve the barrier to stronger pesticide regulation posed by the 
limitations of only testing the active ingredient alone, instead of as a mixture with the inert 
ingredients it is used with. Only testing an active ingredient doesn’t tell the EPA enough about a 
pesticide to fully understand it’s potential effects, because when humans and the environment are 
exposed to a pesticide, they are exposed to the formulation. Testing formulations has 
demonstrated higher levels of toxicity than tests of just the active ingredient in the formulation, 
and higher demonstrated toxicity ideally would lead to stronger regulation.  
Amending FIRFA will be difficult given the anticipated strong pushback from the 
agrochemical industry and its substantial lobbying power. However, FIRFA has been amended to 
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be more protective of public health in the past, therefore there is hope that in the future it is 
plausible the act could be revised for the better.  
Control	  Industry	  Influence	  Through	  Limiting	  Lobbying	  Spending	  
In order to limit the overblown power of the agrochemical industry, one of the biggest 
factors inhibiting stronger pesticide regulation, it is necessary to impose spending limits on 
lobbying. Lobbying allows money to equate to power, and gives billion dollar corporations huge 
amounts of influence political decisions that affect public health. This imbalance is reflected in 
the fact that “of the 100 organizations that spend the most on lobbying, 95 consistently represent 
business” (Drutman 2015). Along with spending limits, stronger lobbying regulation would 
decrease the ability of industry to play an influential role in regulatory processes. As Lee 
Drutman, a senior fellow at New American working for political reform says, “The problem isn’t 
that corrupt politicians are breaking the law. The problem is that we don’t even have laws for 
them to break” (Drutman 2015). Having conversations about the possibilities of limiting 
lobbying spending to the EPA is important given how entrenched corporate lobbying has become 
in today’s political system.  
Block	   the	   Honest	   and	   Open	   New	   EPA	   Science	   Treatment	   Act	   and	   the	   EPA	   Science	  
Advisory	  Board	  Reform	  Act	  	  	  
In 2017, Republicans reintroduced two bills, the Honest and Open New EPA Science 
Treatment Act (previously known as the Secret Science Reform Act), and the EPA Science 
Advisory Board Reform Act, under the guise of improving transparency and science within the 
EPA. However, together these acts would ultimately undermine the EPA’s ability to act 
independently and use quality science to back regulatory decisions while posing a significant 
threat to the scientific integrity of Scientific Advisory Boards. Moving forward, these bills 
should be shut down by members of the House and Congress who support Scientific Advisory 
Boards made up of unbiased highly qualified academic experts, and science-backed decisions 
that prioritize public health and the environment over industry profits. Organizations concerned 
about environmental health must fight these two bills and others like them to prevent them from 
passing in the Senate, as they have both already passed in the House. Representative Eddie 
Bernice Johnson (D–Texas) states, “Those bills were constructed to hamstring the ability of EPA 
to do about anything to protect the American public” (Cama 2017). 
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As Dr. Andrew Rosenberg of the Union of Concerned Scientists writes, these two bills 
“introduce unreasonable requirements, new delays and added levels of bureaucracy, and increase 
the power of corporations to interfere with laws meant to protect us.” (Andrew Rosenberg 2015). 
The Honest and Open New EPA Science Treatment Act only allows the EPA to use studies that 
are entirely reproducible and “transparent” which would have the effect of making it more 
difficult for the EPA to impose new regulations and “craft them based on the best available 
science” (Sneed 2017). Only allowing the use of studies that are replicable opens the door to the 
exclusion of epidemiology and other long-term health studies if opponents can argue they are not 
entirely “replicable.” Additionally, requiring the EPA to release all data used to back regulatory 
decisions could be limiting if the data involves confidential health information.  
The EPA Scientific Advisory Board Reform Act revises the process for selecting 
members for the Scientific Advisory Board and changes the guidelines for participation on the 
board as well as the terms of office (A Rosenberg 2015). Through allowing industry experts to 
sit on boards, limiting the number of state, local, and tribal officials that can serve on a board, 
and barring independent scientists from serving if they have received a grant from the EPA in the 
past three years, this act opens the door for increased industry influence.  
As “the bills employ insidious, albeit creative, approaches to weaken the ability of 
science to inform federal rule-making,” it is important to keep them from going into effect (A 
Rosenberg 2015) If passed, these bills would accomplish the exact opposite of what this paper 
suggests, through increasing industry influence in the regulatory process and increasing 
systematic barriers by requiring unnecessary steps that inhibit the EPA’s processes while not 
providing a sufficient budget. As it is, through informal influences the agrochemical industry has 
too much power in influencing membership of Scientific Advisory Boards, as demonstrated by 
Monsanto impacting the removal of an epidemiologist from the board reviewing the EPA’s 
assessment of glyphosate.  
Additional	  Funding	  for	  Development	  of	  Chemical	  Pesticide	  Alternatives	  	  
Increasing the availability of chemical pesticide alternatives requires adequate generation 
of science focused on developing safe non-chemical pesticides. A grant program offered by the 
EPA currently funds scientists to develop safer chemicals, and additional funding directed to this 
program is recommended. In order to expand funding for the development of alternatives the 
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EPA could gain additional funds from a tax on chemical pesticide producers, similar to the tax 
program on cigarettes established by Prop 56 in California. This program allocates a portion of 
the high tax on cigarettes to low-income health care and tobacco-related disease medical research 
(Legislative Analyst’s Office 2016). One issue with this taxation model applied to chemical 
pesticides, specifically glyphosate, is that it pushes the cost on farmers who have a dependence 
on inexpensive pest and weed control. Increased costs for farmers would likely get passed down 
the supply chain to consumers, and result in higher food costs. However, as part of the fund 
established by this tax goes towards the development of safe and affordable alternative methods 
of pest and weed reduction, hypothetically these products could become widespread and the cost 
of food would go down as alternative pesticides became more affordable. Increasing available 
funding to expand the current EPA grant program is important because it helps sponsor scientists 
working to develop alternatives, which would help advance existing technologies and widen 
options available to farmers.  
Existing alternatives have been developed from substances such as microbial 
biopesticides, insect pheromes, and plant-based products such as garlic spray. Further 
development of alternative pesticides could be aided by the encouragement of farmer/researcher 
partnerships. If more industrial-scale farmers supported using alternative pesticides, that would 
help reduce the demand for chemical pesticides and increase demand for alternatives. 
When considering the benefits of a pesticide, regulatory agencies take into account the 
cost of removing the agent in consideration, as well as the availability of replacements. If there 
are not a wide variety of inexpensive alternatives, the relative weight of benefits (of allowing 
continued use) increases, whereas if inexpensive and safe alternatives are plentiful, the EPA will 
be more likely to take stronger action. Therefore, funding the development of alternative 
pesticides directly addresses an important barrier to stronger pesticide regulation.  
Additional	  Funding	  to	  the	  OPP	  
Additional funding directed to the Office of Pesticide Programs (OPP) could allow the 
office to hire more statisticians, which presumably would help correct errors Portier identified 
with the way the OPP analyzed available data on glyphosate (errors that likely occur in the 
analysis of other pesticides as well). This funding could also be directed to hire additional 
epidemiologists in the OPP in order to balance out the consideration of epidemiology and animal 
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studies. Sass, Freese, and Marquez mentioned the need for further incorporation of 
epidemiology, and hiring a permanent epidemiologist to the OPP is a practical recommendation 
only hindered by the proposed reduction in funding to the EPA. As mentioned previously, 
additional funding to the OPP is unlikely, especially in light of a proposed bill to cut funding to 
the program and replace it with fees paid by corporations or individuals applying to register a 
pesticide product (R. Davis 2017).  
With additional epidemiologists, the OPP would be better rounded, and epidemiological 
studies would likely receive higher consideration and be analyzed more fully with a trained 
epidemiologist on staff. Epidemiology studies are important to consider in pesticide regulation 
because they look at how formulations (as opposed to just active ingredients) affect humans (as 
opposed to lab rats) based on reported exposure.  
Increase	  Role	  of	  Non-­‐Profits	  in	  Pesticide	  Regulation	  to	  Balance	  Corporate	  Influence	  
When asked about the role of nonprofits in the pesticide regulation process, experts 
working for Non-Profit Organizations (NGOs) cited the need for NGOs to stay involved through 
participating in public meetings, submitting official comments, supporting or proposing good 
legislation, bringing on public pressure, talking more with the EPA, and performing health 
impact studies (Sass 2017) (Freese 2017) (Marquez 2017). NGO employees and academic 
scientists can engage further with regulatory scientists through inviting regulatory scientists to 
academic forums on pesticides and toxicity on a more frequent basis than is done currently, in 
order to balance out industry engagement with regulatory scientists. Another role of NGO’s that 
many already undertake (such as PANNA and Food and Water Watch) includes educating 
consumers about chemical pesticides, in terms of specific effects of eating food with pesticide 
residue, and in terms of effects faced by farmworkers and ecosystems burdened by excessive 
pesticide use. Consumer education is important for shifting the market demand towards organic 
products, as has been seen in the past 10 years with total U.S. organic sales going from below 
$19 billion to over $40 billion between 2006 and 2015 (McNeil 2016). Education surrounding 
glyphosate is especially important to combat years of industry controlled dialogue pushing the 
idea that glyphosate is harmless. 
NGO’s can also help keep information transparent by making Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA) requests for information concerning regulatory decisions where there is suspected 
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industry involvement. Reporting on such information and bringing it to the public can help keep 
regulators accountable, and discourage under the table dealings with agrochemical producers 
such as Monsanto. Ultimately, changes need to happen at the federal level to prevent widespread 
exposure to dangerous chemical pesticides. However in the mean time, nonprofits can act to 
support minimizing public exposure to potentially carcinogenic pesticides, especially by pushing 
state and local governments to regulate chemical pesticide use.  
Encourage	  State	  and	  Local	  Level	  Pesticide	  Regulation	  
Given the current administration in the United States and its proposed staff and budget 
cuts to the EPA, predicted industry-lenient attitude, and decision not to ban chlorpyrifos, the 
most important area to gain traction for change in pesticide regulation lies at the state and local 
level. State and local restrictions on pesticide use carried out by state and local governments and 
encouraged by nonprofits are recommended. States have the power to regulate pesticides, or 
control factors relating to pesticide use, beyond the level they are regulated at the federal level. 
At the local level, action is already being taken to ban glyphosate, as can be seen in cities such as 
Boulder, Malibu, and Richmond. This presents a method to get around the barriers at the federal 
level to banning potentially carcinogenic pesticides. Difficulties associated with getting states 
and local governments to ban glyphosate include the limited availability of and education on 
alternatives, but primarily the higher costs of alternatives deters decision makers from supporting 
the switch. Such difficulties are surmountable, evident through cities and states that have 
successfully taken action in support of reducing pesticide exposure. 
Successful state action occurred recently in California, when the state won a lawsuit 
against Monsanto over adding glyphosate to the list of carcinogens requiring label under Prop 
65.9 This listing is important because California often acts ahead of the trend on environmental 
health issues, and actions taken in California can influence other states to follow suit through 
providing a framework (Schmidt 2007). Presumably when an item is labeled as a carcinogen, 
people will be more wary in choosing a product containing glyphosate, and may opt for a safer 
option instead. This ultimately could lead to lower levels of glyphosate in the environment, and 
demonstrates the ability of state action to reduce pesticide use. Another potential example of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9 Prop 65 is a California state law requiring warning signs when there is risked exposure to potentially 
carcinogenic chemicals 
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state based action is taking place in Hawaii, where state senator Josh Green plans to propose 
legislation that would ban glyphosate, which, if realized, would make Hawaii the first state to do 
so (“Newsmakers: What Lawmakers Are Doing and Saying” 2017).  
As more cities and towns ban glyphosate, suspicions over the safety of the chemical are 
likely to increase, which could spur additional local governments to impose stricter regulations 
on glyphosate use. Such a snowball effect can be observed in plastic bag bans that are occurring 
in more and more cities, counties, and states across the country. Additional action by individual 
institutions and municipalities, where large quantities of glyphosate are used, presents an 
important avenue for changing pesticide use habits. While state and local action does not directly 
address solving the barriers to regulating potentially carcinogenic pesticides, it provides a way 
around the barriers to achieve the ultimate goal of stronger regulation on potential carcinogens, 
which is to remove them from the environment.  
Conclusion	  
Strong pesticide regulation that minimizes future public exposure is incredibly important 
given the widespread use of glyphosate and the potential harm this could implicate due to 
IARC’s finding that glyphosate is a probable carcinogen. The agency regulating pesticides must 
be able to come to conclusions over the danger of an agent without overt influence from the 
industry that will profit from loose regulation. This paper asks the question; What are the 
primary barriers to banning potentially carcinogenic pesticides, and can IARC’s methods for 
determining glyphosate a probable carcinogen inform the EPA’s hazard assessment process? The 
answer to this question can be applied more broadly to encompass other pesticides beyond those 
that are potentially carcinogenic, and identifies aspects of the EPA that can be changed to make 
the system for regulating pesticides more protective of public health. 
The key barriers to stronger restrictions on potentially carcinogenic pesticides are 
identified by interviews with experts in pesticide regulation in the United States with knowledge 
about glyphosate, as well as the literature. Barriers include the wide reach of industry influence, 
in both the formal and informal spheres, systematic issues within the Office of Pesticide 
Programs, such as program cuts and growing numbers of pesticides to review, considering the 
benefits of a pesticide during regulatory processes, only examining active ingredients instead of 
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formulations, and giving too much weight to animal studies and not enough to epidemiology 
studies. Additional barriers specific to glyphosate include minimal low cost alternatives, 
widespread dependence of farmers on the herbicide, and errors made in the hazard assessment 
leading the EPA to not recognize its carcinogenic potential paving the way for less stringent 
regulation.  
IARC provides an independent standard against which to examine the EPA’s hazard 
assessment of the carcinogenic potential of glyphosate. Understanding how they differ helps 
point out areas in which the EPA is influenced by industry, as this is an important difference 
between the two assessments. Barriers to the EPA determining pesticides are carcinogenic exist, 
as when they are removed, as in the IARC report on glyphosate, a more sensitive conclusion is 
reached. This has broad implications, because if the EPA fails to find a pesticide carcinogenic 
when in reality it is, such a pesticide would then be approved for use at levels that, 
unacknowledged by the EPA, cause cancer in the population. With cancer being a leading cause 
for death in America today, the public health implications of a regulatory failure such as refusing 
to properly regulate a carcinogen are enormous.  
In order to expand on this research, areas for potential future study include an in depth 
analysis of Enlist Duo (the formulation proposed by Dow Chemical that combines glyphosate 
with 2,4-D and was approved for use by the EPA), a feasibility study on the ability of the EPA to 
test the top 20 pesticide formulations given available resources and trade secret laws, and a study 
on the best methods for nonprofits to use in order to effectively engage with the EPA to further 
balance the influence of agrochemical companies. A study mapping glyphosate use and 
overlaying it with incidence of Non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma would provide an interesting addition 
to the literature. Expanding this analysis further could look at the barriers to banning glyphosate 
in developing countries. This could be a compelling topic because multiple developing countries 
have banned glyphosate, which would provide a comparison to assist with the analysis. 
Additionally, while research into the effectiveness of pesticide enforcement efforts in supporting 
the regulations that are so tedious to develop exists, creating an in depth analysis of this issue 
would be a valuable contribution.  
The results of the 2016 election represent a significant step backwards for stricter 
chemical policy and protecting public health and the environment from the effects of toxic 
pesticides. Most of the barriers mentioned in this paper will likely be exacerbated to new levels 
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under the current EPA leadership and Republican majority. Pruitt’s decision not to ban 
chlorpyrifos demonstrates an unwillingness to prioritize public health when it comes to chemical 
pesticide exposure. Nonetheless, through preparing to draft amendments to FIRFA, expand 
funding for pesticide alternatives, direct funding to the OPP to hire more statisticians and 
epidemiologists, and encouraging state-level pesticide regulation while increasing independent 
scientists’ involvement with regulatory scientists, pesticide regulation can feasibly escape undue 
industry influence and be more protective of public health and the environment in the future.  
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Appendix	  	  
1.	  History	  of	  Acts	  and	  Laws	  Relating	  to	  Pesticides	  
Before the creation of the EPA in 1970, the USDA and the FDA were the primary 
governing agencies responsible for regulating chemical pesticides (F. R. Davis 2014). In 1938, 
Congress passed the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), marking an important 
early legislation for pesticides (F. R. Davis 2014). This act introduced setting safe levels of 
“unavoidable” poisonous substances, like pesticides, on food. As the name implies, the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) had implications wider reaching than just pesticides, 
but this paper focuses only on the impacts these acts had on chemical pesticide regulation.  
In the years following the passage of FFDCA, regulators began to realize the limitations 
of this act in regards to controlling the use of pesticides derived from organic chemistry, such as 
DDT and organophosphates, which were growing in popularity at the time (F. R. Davis 2014).10 
The inability to set stronger regulations influenced the drafting and passage of the 1947 Federal 
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIRFA) (F. R. Davis 2014). FIRFA is regarded as 
key pesticide legislation, as it required pesticides to be registered before sale and product labels 
to specify content and whether the substance was poisonous. Post FIRFA, registration is required 
for all pesticides on the market, and approval for use is granted by the governing agency, 
pending testing of the proposed active ingredient. While the initial version of the act tended 
toward leniency for industry, overall, it served as a step towards further development of stronger 
regulation (F. R. Davis 2014).  
FIRFA has been amended numerous times since 1947; notably in 1964, when an 
amendment increased the authority of the governing agency (not yet the EPA) to remove 
products from the market based on safety concerns by removing or suspending registration of a 
pesticide (F. R. Davis 2014). This amendment changed FIRFA to require special consideration of 
pesticides thought to cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment. The act defines this 
as, “(1) any unreasonable risk to man or the environment, taking into account the economic, 
social, and environmental costs and benefits of the use of any pesticide, or (2) a human dietary 
risk from residues that result from a use of a pesticide in or on any food inconsistent with the 
standard” (Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 2012). After this update, any 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10 Organophosphate pesticides have strong evidence of neurological damage, and can be acutely toxic in 
high doses (“Organophosphate Insecticides” 1996). 
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pesticide sold or used in the United States must first be approved by the regulating agency based 
on the determination that it does not cause any unreasonable adverse effects. 
In 1970, the EPA was created and assumed responsibility for regulating pesticides, 
partially in order to lessen the influence of agricultural special interests groups on the regulatory 
process that existed when the USDA and FDA were in charge, and increase the influence of 
consumer and environmental groups (Cropper et al. 1992). Within the EPA, the Office of 
Pesticide Programs (OPP) reviews approved studies on the effects of a pesticide that is either 
being proposed for registration or undergoing a periodic registration review.  
The Federal Environmental Pest Control Act (FEPCA) passed in 1972, and amended 
FIRFA by significantly increasing authority of the newly created EPA in regulating pesticides. It 
is important to note that this happened after the publication of Silent Spring, the influential book 
by Rachel Carson featuring DDT that widened public awareness and outcry over the 
environmental disasters pesticides could cause (Griswold 2012). The discourse among regulators 
was leaning towards the need for stronger regulation, however Silent Spring is credited with 
creating a substantial ripple effect as far as increasing awareness and wariness among the 
American public, especially among environmentalists (F. R. Davis 2014). An important aspect of 
FEPCA includes the reexamination of the safety of pesticides registered in the prior four years. 
In 1976, the Toxic Substances Control Act was passed, requiring the government to 
ensure that “chemicals are properly tested and regulated before they reach the market, and don’t 
pose any unreasonable risk to human and environmental health” (Black 2005). TSCA was an 
important step in controlling the use of pesticides, but concerns still existed after its passage over 
chemical safety and the adequacy of the legislation (Black 2005). Recent updates to TSCA help 
address these concerns, and hopefully will lead to improvements in speeding up the risk 
assessment process, prioritizing chemicals to assess, and increasing funding for costs of new 
chemical reviews and TSCA implementation activities (OCSPP US EPA 2016).  
The Food Quality Protection Act (FQPA), passed in 1996, updates FIRFA as an 
important asset to stronger regulations of pesticides applied to food products because it mandates 
that the EPA impose a “safety factor” reduction of chronic reference dose level by three to ten 
percent if there is any uncertainty about the safety of a chemical (Public Law 104-170 1996).11 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11 Chronic reference dose refers to an estimate of daily exposure to a chemical through ingestion 
that likely would not cause any risk or deleterious effects during a lifetime (EPA 2011).  
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This uncertainty can arise from gaps in data, conflicting studies, or questions over the quality of 
toxicology data (Myers et al. 2016). The safety factor is intended to protect infants and children, 
as they are more affected by chemical exposure than adults and are considered a sensitive 
population (Wilson and Schwarzman 2009). FQPA additionally requires the EPA to reassess 
pesticide tolerances every 10 years, giving “priority to those that pose the greatest risk to public 
health” (Public Law 104-170 1996). Another important aspect of this act is the limitation of the 
consideration of benefits in setting new tolerances, so that such considerations only apply to non-
threshold effects of pesticides (such as carcinogenicity, which does not have a threshold). 
However, benefits still play a role in consideration of existing tolerances, which applies to all 
pesticides on the market prior to 1996, a large group that includes glyphosate (F. R. Davis 2014).  
 
2.	  Full	  List	  of	  Interview	  Questions	  
1. Do you believe the EPA should impose stricter regulations on potentially carcinogenic 
pesticides?  
2. Do you believe it is important for the EPA to restrict the use of/ strengthen regulation of 
glyphosate? (To what extent, and why?) 
3. What do you believe are the key barriers affecting the EPA’s decision to ban potentially 
carcinogenic pesticides?  
a. Specific barriers in the risk assessment process? 
b. Specific barriers with glyphosate? 
4. What is your opinion on the role of the agrochemical industry in the pesticide regulation 
process? 
5. How do you see the role of NGOs in the pesticide regulation process?  
6. Do you think the EPA’s process (just the hazard identification phase) could benefit from 
becoming more like that of IARC? 
7. Is there anything fundamentally wrong with the risk assessment process itself (ie how 
acceptable daily intake level is calculated or only looking at active ingredients instead of 
marketed formulations), or do you see the main barrier to stricter regulation as industry 
involvement? (or both?) 
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